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CHAPTER I

In order to understand the dramatic controversy in the American
Senate over the provision in the Versailles Treaty for a League of Nations,
it is necessary, to be conscious of the state
at the opening

or World War

or

mind of the United States

I, to be acquainted \dth the id.eals and aims of

the president, Woodrow Wilson, to be aware

or

the advocacy of the League to

enforce pea.ce by the Republlcan _-president William H. 'l'aft, and finally, to
know the rea.sons for the opposition in the Senate, in contrast to .. the vibrant

support afforded president Wilson d.uring his .tint term.
The trooi tional dogma of polltical isolation dominated American
thought, but in reality, the nation was becoming more and more involved in

world. affairs on every aide.

~ince

the Spanish American War, the United.

States had assumed a place among the world powers.l

It was committed. half.'wq
I

around the world in the Philippine Islands; it occupied. the strategic center

of the Pacti'ic at Hawaii, it had built the Panama Canal and was gradually extending its control over the Caribbean Sea.

American interest in Latin

Am.erica .. theoretically established a century before by the Honroe Doctrine
had become intensely practical in Ic1exico.

American trade had become .. almost by magic. world iti1.ue. Marruf'ac-

turers of st.eel, cotton and machinery were invading all the countries

or

the

earth and facing bit.ter competition with the British, the Germa.ns, the Ii'rench

...
1924, 7.

1 nay Stannard Baker, The Versailles Treaty and Atter, New York,

I

II

2

.

and last with the Japanese. Hore Am{Jrican money was

L'fJing

invm:rt,cd in nussia,

China and Latin Amerioan than ever betore. To say that America had no interest in world affairs or was isolated and aloof in 1914 was absurd.
Vi.'hile the Amerioan people 'Were vlalldng with.

or

tu~eir

heads "in a cloud

traditional and sentimental isolation", their feet were taking them into

every kind of bewildering international complications.

2

This doubleminded-

ness of American opinion elq.Jl'CSsed. itself vividly a.'uring the first two years
of the \;lorld War.

peace.

President rJUson's procr<:ml from first to last was one of

Ar.r:r stl.l.d¥

of his messages, speeches I and letters will show that, above

evcrzrthing else in the turmoil, President t-/Uson was thi&...ine ani working for

a sinela goal -

trying to use the miGhty pwer and prestige of .America

to

bring the blessings of peace to the 'Wol'ld.
During the Hexican crisis when certain interests were moving heaven
and earth to drive us into h08tili ties, Wilson declared with solemn earnest-

ness!
We cannot J!ilect this European situation, and use our pO'IIIer
to bring world~e i f we have one hand tied behind us in a
\:n:.1"

"'lith Mexico~ J

Not satisfied to serve as a passive custodian of our great tradi-

tions II Wilson desired to expand the sphere of their influence and to put
I

them at the greater service of manldnd.

This be proposed to do with a J,eagu a

2 ~., 7-8.

3

~.,

9.

4 Arthur Bemon Tourtcllot,
T9AA,y, New York, 193$, $1.

ed., Woodrow fJilson Selections

for'
-

.3
of Nations whicb was a partial pla:n for internationalizing the world..

This

plan aimed at a world federation of nations sibrl.lar to the federal government

established b.1 the North American states in 1789.'
Wilson '8 plan for a League of Nations was not new for it had a life
of three oenturies behind it.

Saints and philosophers had been its notarl6s,6

but it was not until the twentieth cent-uri that it entered the realm of practical politics as a result of the horrors of the Russian-Japaneae 'Waz.7
Theodore Roosevelt's partiCipation in the arbitration settling the
nussian-Japanese War qualified him to introduce a scheme for \lorld peace.
In his speech before the Nobel Prize Conmlittee in Christiana,

NoI'\~ay

in 1910,

he urged the further developm.ent of arbitration in settling disputes. This
famous address included both his criticism of the preva.il1ng Hague Tribunal anc
suggestions for a means of assuring safety. In Roosevelt'8 opinion, IlThe
supreme difficulty in connection with the developing of

pel:U.~e

at the Hague

arose from the lack of an executive power or of any police power to enforce
the decrees of' tile cou.r1i."
if' those great powers

Roosevelt believed it would be a Ilmaster stroke

honest~

bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not

only to keep peace among themselves, but to ;;revent, by torce i f necessary,

its being broken by others."

;; Scott Nearini' United World, The Road to International Peace,
New York, 1945, h5.
1920, 59.

6 HtmI7 Noel BraiUord,

ed., A L!!9rne of Nations, 2nd «1. New York,
-

7 "The League to Enforce Peace,"
June, 1916, 358.

-

I~$llt,

N ew York, LXXXVI,

4
To insure safety Roosevelt s~geated that, "Each nation rrhst keep
well prepared to defend itself until the estaolis.l:W1ent at some form of international. police power, competent and willing to prevent violence ••• between
• •• natiOll8 to oommand. peace throughout the world could best be assured by

some oombinations between those great nations which

8in~

and have not themselves tli.o'Ugh,t of oClllm1tting aggression."

desired peace

The future anti-

League leader was oertain at this time that the "ruler Or statesman who would
bring about such a oombination would have earned. bia place in history tor all
time and bis title to the Gl"i;ltltude of all

The horrors or the great

manldnd."

catao~

8

had been so t.errlble that

Roosevelt was certain that the combatants would be \dl.ling to consider a
world court supported by force. 9 In a statement af'ter statement Roosevelt
showed that he was

re~

to tbrow the waole force of a league against any

nation which transgressed at the expense ot another nation
which had been guaranteed to all. He also realized the

~

~

of the rights

objections that

would be brought against his plan, but he was confident that it would put the

"oollective strength of civilized manld.nd behind the collective purposes of
ma."lk1nd to secure the peace of righteousness t the peace of justice among the
nations ot the earth." 10

8

~.,

LXVIII, ~, 1910, 1027-29.

9 Theodore Roosevelt, America.!!!! ~ World War, NEM York,

19l5, 18-9.

10 Ibid., 82-3.

•

Roosevelt was not alone in his belie.f that the dq had passed When

.

nations could ignore the need of organization to ma:1ntain peace, but at the
same time, the urgency of applying this pr...nciple to all the nations had become apparent to ex-Pn'Sid.ent WUliam H. Taft, who voioed his opinion to a
group at the OentUlil Club, New York, in OCt.ober, 1914.

"The time has come

when the peace loving nations of the world should organize tbemaelves into
some sort of society in which they s.hould agree to settle their own disputes
by amicable methods, and

s~

to any nation tha.t sta.rted to go to war,

'You

have got to keep the peace or have all the rest of us against you! InU So
many other Americans thought along the same lines that, on June

17, 1915, in

Independence Hall, Philadelphia, a League to Enforce Peaoe was formed with
amost one thousand Americans cooperating.12

This League desired the United States to join a lea.&:rue binding the
signatories.

to submit all justiciable questions to an international oourt

of justice! to submit all otber questlO1l8 to a council of conciliation for

hearing, consideration and recommendation, to use their economic and mU1tary
forces against arq members committing acts ot hostility aeainst another before Su.bmit.ting to arbitration oX' conoiliation. and to hold periodio oonfer-

ences to formulate and oodify international law. JJ
Tbe President had been slow to identi.t"J hi_elf with the Lea.:;ue to

11 F. H. ~ncll'J "Tatt'. Labors tor International Peace," Current
Histoq, lJew York, XWI, }tay, 19.30, 297.
12 "The League to Enforce Peace," Ir:9!?ende:nt, LXXXVI, 346-7.

JJ T. H. Diokinson,

1923, 14-15.

I!:! United States .!!!! l!:! IfgaIue,

New York,

6
J:::n..f'orce Peace or even to accept the invitation tendered by I·Ir. Tatt'\o d.el1ver
an address on Hav 27, 1916, at the. New rIUlard 'Hotel, Wash1rllt.~n, D. C.. At
this meeting one of the principal speakera was no less a personage than Senator Cabot Lodge with Mr. Taft presiding.
For

~\Y

14

months the President had been revolving this idea in his

mind and for a long time he was reluctant to accept aqy invitation that would

seem to give aplJroval. to the idea.

lie patiently waited to make a complete

survey of the world Situation, and to be oonvinoed that the permanent participation of' the United States in world ai"fairs was a necessity i f peace were

to be secure. 15

It was not easy to draw the President away .from: the traditional
policy of aloo.fness and isolation which charaoterized the attitude of the

United States in all international affairs, but the invitation to discuss universal. peace, urged upon the President by the Republioan ex-President William
H. Taft was finally accepted.

16

In that address President \oJilson said.
We are partiCipants, whether we would or not, in the life
of the world, and the interests of the nations are our own; henceforth, there must be a common agreement tor a common object, and
at the heart of t,hat common object must be the inviolable rijjlts
of peoples and of mankind. We believe these fundamental things t

lh Current H1stm, Ma.y, 1930, 298.
1$ Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson!! 1. Knew Him. New York,
1921, 1.26.

-

16 Ibid.

7
First, that every people has a ri~t to ch.oose the sovereignty
under which they shall live. Second, that the small states ot the
world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty
and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations
expect and insist upon) and third, that the world has a ri;;.ht to
be free from every disturbance of its peace tbat has 1ts origin in
agression and disregard of tb,$ rights of peoples and natiOl'ls. 11
Those statements were unttered in the presence of Senator Lodge and applauded

CrJ Hr. Ta..""'t and his Republican associates gathered at the banquet. 18

The President cont.inued that he was oonvinoed that there should be
a "universal association of nations to maintain the inviolable security
highwS3'

or

or

the

the seas for the common use of the nations of the world, and to pre-

vent any war either contrary to treaty a,ereementa or without waming and full
submission of the causes to the opinion of the world -

a virtual guarantee

of territorial integrity and political independence." He Yentured to assert,
in the presence of Senator Lodge, who afterward became the leader of the oppo-

sition to these very ideas, "that the United States 18 willing to become a
partner in any feasible association of nations tormed. in order to realize

those objects and make them secure 4{{ainst violation." 19
Woodrow Wilson believed that the Leaeue of Nations was the tirst

modern attempt to prevent war by discussion in the open and not behind closed
doors or "within the oloistered retreats

17

or

Tourtellot, Woodrow Wilson,

European diplomacy.1f To him the

l2h.

18 Tumulty, Woodrow ~Uson !!. ! _Kn_cw_H.......
ir4" 421.
19 Tourtellot, Woodrow rJilson Sel.ections !2!: T22N:, 126.

• 6
LL'~~e of Nations was the essence

at Chriatian.ity. 20 yet, when the League

of Nations t advocac"',{ was taken up by Wilson, Senator Lodge, the spokesman at
the Re,publican party at the dinner

or

the League to Woree Peace, became the

leader in bitter opposition to it. 21
Senator Lodge at this very dinner on May 27, 1916, delivered the
following address t

I know, and no one, I think, can know better than one who
has served. long in the senate, which is charged with an iIportant
share of the r atiticat10n and. confirmation of all treaties J no one
can, I ttlink, feel more deep~ than I do the d1tticulties. which confront us in the work which this league - that ia, the great association extending throughout the oOl.Ul't.J7, known as the League to enforce Peace - undertakes, but the difficulties cannot be overcome
unless we try to overcome them. I believe, muoh can be done. Probab~ it will be impossible to stop all wars, but it certainly will
be possible to stop aome wars, and thus d1m1nisb their number. The'
w~ in which the problem must be worked out must be lett to the
league and to those who are giving this great subject the stuq it
deserves. I know the obstacles. I mow how quickq we shall be
met with the stat.ement that this is a. dangerous question which ;you
are putting into your argt..IDIEmt, that no nation can submit to the
judpent at other nations, and we muat be caretul at the beginning
not to attempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise when
we speak ot B.1\Vtbing which seems to involve alliance, but I do not
believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances
he meant for one moment that we should. not join with the other civilized nations of the world i f a method oould be .found. to ciimish
war and encourage peace.
It was a year ago in delivering the Chancellor. s address at
Union College I made an arcument on tli1s theory, tha.t if we were
to promote inte.m.ationaJ. law as it must be restored, we must find.
SODle wlq in which the united. toreN ot the nation could be put behind the cause of peace and law. I sa1ci then that my hearers midlt
think that I W88 just picturing a Ut.Gpia, but it 18 in the search
of Utopi88 tb.at great discoveries aN made. Not failure, but low

20 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson!!!!!.!!! Him, 427.
21 RB\V' Stannard Baker,

rae*" War,

lieu

lone,

225.

9
aim, is crime. This league 1& cert~ aiming high tor the b&lefits or humanity, and because the pathwQ2is sown with difficulties
is no reason that we should tum from it. 2

Three days later, r·!r. Wilson declarec!,
I believe ~t the peoples of the United States are ripe tor
entrance into an international league whose main object shall be
to guarantee international justice and right in the whole world.
George vlasbington wamed us ar,ainst mixing ourselves up in other
peoples I conflicts or alliances. I shall never IQ'Selt consent to
artf alliance that would mix us up in conflicts between other nationa, but I shall be glad to join an alliance which will unite
the peoples for keeping tIle peace of the world on the b~is of universal justice. Therein is liberation not. limitation. 23
In his campaign for reelection Wilson continued to voice this same
belief.

24

Up to this time there was 'Virtually no dissent in the

~

parts of the United States from the idea of an orga.ni£ed peace to replace the

old drifting policy which alwqs bad and forever must lead us to war.
active leaders

or both parties

The

to a

had Committed themselves Wholeheart~

league for peace which would protect the rights of all, certainly, at the

very least, territorial integrity and independence.

2S

The campaign ot 1916 does not sea to have produced any cleavage
on the question.

It did however, bring about an iasua between Woodrow Wilson

and Henry Cabot Lod&e which removed any basis

ot cooperation which might have

existed. between them later.

22 Henry Cabot Lodge,
tlew York, 1925, 1.31-2.

!!!! Senate .!!!!!2! Le!ee

o~

Nations,

23 Lars P. !lelsOZl, President viilson, the World's Peace-maker,
Stockholm, 1919, 205-6.
•,
ad

24 Ibid..,

20~.

2S4! D. F. Fleming, The United. States and the ~e of tlatiomJ,
New York, 1932, 12.
- ,
d

10
Wilson had approved tile cabinet's "strict acoountability" note to
Oerm&1V on the sinking of the Lusitania, but l1ryan, his Secretary of State,
fearing the acousation that our policy was strict with Germany, but lenient
with Britain, (whose action was far from nawless)26 persuaded the President

to permit him to draft an instruction to Ambassador Gerard oJ: the German gove:mment announcing that the United States would be willing to submit the question at issue to a commission of investigation on the principle ot the Br,yan
treaties. The State Department at onoe saw the consistency ot the instruction
with the President.s note and Wilson

WaIJ

soon besieged with requests to recon-

sider. He did so and on hearing the oount.er arguments ordered the instruction
suppressed.. 27
Senator Lodge oonsidered this a dramatic plq of forces within the
administration and attempted to prove that Wilson

tection

or .Amerioan

WM

indiffeeent to the pro-

rights and that Gel"flUiUV knew he would not defend our

rights beoause iShe was receiving hints that his strong words were tor home

oonsumption. Instead. he asserted that the President's whole policy shifted
with the currents of publio opinion to avoid doing ~. 28

Loc.lie's accusation brought from !1r. Wilson on October .30, 1916
statement published in the
charge.

!!! Republic,

&

in which be denied the truth of the

From Wilson's point of view his motives in the crisis had been

throughout to do what was best and his best judgment had prevailed, but SenatQ '"
Lodge felt. that his opinion of the President's conduct was correct and main27 Ibid., 146.

28 Lodes,!!!! Senate.!!!! S!

Leagu\~

,2.£

Nations,

34-56.

n
maintained his stand. 29 Shortly' af't(e,r, on January 13 J 1917, WUson ·re.f.'used to
speak from the same platform and there 18 no evidenoe that arr:! cOrdiality was
ever resumed. between them.
In an address to Congress on January 22, 1917, the President dis-

closed his thoughts £orming in his mind in regard to the duty of our govern-

ment if it were called upon £or cooperation in laying the .t'OUDdation of peace
among nations. He believed that the mission or the American democracy ttwaa

nothing lees than" to add tbeir authority and power to the authority and power

ot other nations to guarantee peace

and. justice throughout the world.

He de-

sired. to have our government ready to present the conditions upon which it
would feel justUied in asking our people to approve ita romal and solemn ad.herence to a League £or Peace when the proper time arrived.
Some o£ the conditions be considered necessary tor a permanent

peace were. (1) a peace without victory', (2) the right of selt-determ1nation,
(3) .t'reedom

or

the seas, (4) disarmament, (S) a League of Nations to adm:3..n-

ister the peace. The question upon which the whole future peace end pol1q of
the war depended was thiet Rls this present war a struggle for a just am1 se-

cure peace, or only tor a tf!Jt1 nations to £om a new balance o£ power?" A balance of power could not cuarantee a "stable Europe.'"

~

a ccamm1ty of pow-

er would br:l.n.g organized common peace. "There was no entangling alliance in

a concert of power." This concert would provide a foree, greater than tb.e

force of any nation, that no
peace

1;0

ag~sive

nation oould stand against. It the

be made were to endure, it would have to be a peace made secure by

29 Ibid.,

146.

12

•
In reply t.o t.he President.s

address~

Lodge pointed out t.o the Senate

on February 1, 1917, the dangerous implicat.ions of t.he pr1ncivlea laid down by

the President and definitely parted comapny with the idea ot a league of na-

tlona.31 To Lodge the idea of asking the belligorents to stack their arms and
make peace before e1th0I' sic.!.e \Jas conquered was a strange proposal. Too, he
predicted, many difficulties in appJ;ying the principles of self-determination

would arise. ;''bat would be done about Korea, Hindustan, Alsace Lorraine,
Trentino, the Slav Provinces of Austria or the Danish Duchies? Who would decide whether the principle is recognized. under tho different governments of

the world with whan we are to

tom

the Lea(.'Ue for pea.ce?32

The enforcement of the doctrine ot the freedom

ot the seas I Lodge

thought would involve us in every war which might occur between maritime na-

tions. Besides, the idea of enforcing peace had lost its attraction to hita.
The refusal of a member to abide by a decision might mean war.

In that event

every member would be obliged to send a quota of troops which would be inspected by the league's officers and ordered abou1i by them.
After serious consideration his thoughts altered in regard to the

precepts of' Wsshint:,-r'ton. Was...1rlngton's policy had been set. forth under condi-

tions not unlike t.hose which now existed and its wisdom supplemented by that

)0

Tourt.ellot, Woodrow Wilson Selections

£e!

Tod&, 128-36.

0rn-

31 U. S. Oont..'T8SS, Senate, House Joint Resolution 333,
siona]. Reco19 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., Tburs~, Feb. 1, 1917, Vol. $~ 3,
~JashIiigton,
11, 2364.
32 Ibid.., 2.367-66.

or

J. Ad.axas, Jefferson, Madison, 140nr0e, and J. Q. Adalne, and had be1m demon-

IStrate<! for more tban a centur.y and should not'be departc'<i .fram "witl:u:m.t most
lPowertul reasons and without knowing exactly where the4.'Dparture would lead."ll

rEhe league, Lodge continued, would necessitate stem realities. True, a
league for peace sounded enoouraging, but it was a grave matter.
~utt1ng

torce behind peace and making war on

its decisions.

arty

It meant

nation which did not obfq

Lodge presented two examples of problems such as members o£

the league might be forced to

race ..

1. Assume that such. a league has been tol"DlEKl ••• and that •••
China and Japan demand tor their people the right of tree emigration to Canada, Australia and. New Zealand. Suppose the league
grants the permiSSion, but Canada, Australla and New Zealand backed by England refuse to accept the decision. Would we be willing
to make war on Canada in such a cause as th1a?

2. Suppose the Asiatic powers demand the tree admission ot their
labor to the United Statea and we resist, but the decision of the
league goes against us, are we going to accept it?
Detore giving our support toa league for peace, Lodge was convinced that all

these contingencies should be considered.. 34

Lodee was not unw1l.l.ing to us. the pcRIler and innuence ot the
Un!ted. States toward a permanent, peace.

He merely wanted to save us ,fraa a

worse condition than existed. His oounter program contained tour practioable
measures. They were.

(1) adequate national preparedness,

tation o£ international law at the olose ot the war,

II

Ibid.,

2365.

34

~.,

2.369.

(2) the rehaMli-

(3) with necessa:r.Y and

..it.ural limits, to extend the use

or voluntary

and mobilize publlc opinion behind it,

arbitration, so tar

'* possible

(b) to'urge a general reduction of

armaments by all nationa.
In conclusion, he

heartil~

supported the reaGlut,1on offered. by

senator Borah camdt.t1ng us without reserve to the polley of Washington and
Honroe in regard to .foreign nat1ons.

Lodge now saw nothi.ng but perU in aban.-

doning our long e.tel:! shed policy.35

In the exc1tement attendant upon the German submarine campaign,
then approaching its cl.im8X, 14r. Lodge's speech attracted llttle atte.ntion.J6
The President adv1aed our own declaration

or war

within a month and Wormed

the Senate that his thoughts expressed on the preceding Januar,y twenty-second
had not changed. WilBon made it

clf'"ar

that. Amed.ca was OPPOl5l.ng the German

autocracy rathel' than the Gennan people and closed. hi. messace with the p .....
oration which gained wider currency tlum arq part of his messagel
It is a tearful thing to lead thl.s great. peaceful nation into
war •••But the right is more precious than peace, and we sball tight
for ••• democracy, tor the right of those who submit to author!ty to
bave a voice in their own governments, tor the rights and liberties
of small natiOns, tor a. universal dominion or right by such a. concert. or tree peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all. nations
and make the world itself tree.,}7

Through the subsequent months the Pre3ident was aided by leadera
of public opinion everywhere in driving home to the peoples of the allied and.

enEm\f countries alike that we were engaged in a. crusade to end a.utocracy and

-
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Ibid., 2)70.
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or ~ations,

!2t T~,
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137-47.

.or. The war was li!ted to the highest place.

Many

men went ovenu1aa, coo-

£ident that this service or sacri.fice would help to establish a new and better
order of atfaiI'8.38
on January 8, 191B, the next official statement came boom the
president in a message

to Congress in which he :repeated our demand Iftbat the

world be made fit and sare to live in.tt The mess ace included the fourteen

points upon which be thou.ght the peace should. I,) e baaed, the last of which
read.

itA general association of nations must be tomed under specific cove-

nants tor the purpose of affording mutual guarantee o£ political1ndependenee
and territorlalintegr1ty to great and small atates al.ike • .39
Agair. on Februar;r 11, 1918, in an addreas to Congress

analyz1ni

Genr.an and Austrian poace utterances, the President declared again.

lieve that our own desire

1"01"

"We be-

a. new international order under which reason

and justice and the common interests

or mankind

shall prevail is the desire

of enlightened man everywhere ••••Having set. our hand to the task of achieving

it, we shall. not tum back.u40
On

JulJ' 4, 1918, near the close at the war, the President summed

up the allied war object1ves in one sentence.

law based upon the consent

opinion

or mank1nd. n41
38

or

"What we seek 18 the reign of

tho governed' and sustained by t.he organized

The whole program that he was lat.er to fight for an

Lawrence,!ll! ~ Story .2!. WoocI...-ow \..JUson,

39 Tourtellot" t;!.oodrow Wil;aon Selections

Ibid.,
41
54.

40

168-69.

~.,

220.

!2!: Todaz,

lS'I-61.
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both sides of the ocean is in that short statement.

•

In late September when the surrender of Bulgaria forecast the end

of the war, the President went to New York, to state as carefully as he could
the kind of peace that should come after the conflict ceased.

He spoke in the

Hetropolltan Opera House on September 27, from a written manuscript, a thing
he rarely did.
The depth of Wilson's conviction that the peace must not be one or
old-fashioned bargaining i f it were to last was shown in his declaration that

"il ••• the governments associated against GermaQY ••• intend ••• to achieve ••• a secure and lasting peace that they must come to the peace table prepared to pay
the price that will procure it. They must likewise be ready to create in some
virile fashion the onl¥ instrumentality by which ••• the agreements of the peace
will be honored and fulfilled...

The price was to be "impartial justice" in

every item of settlement, "no matter whose interest is crossed, and not only
impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League

o;t

Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious."
The time when the League of Nations was to be formed was clear in
the President's mind.

He said, "And as I see it, the constitution of that

League ot Nations and the clear definition of its object must be a pan, in a
sense the most essential part of the peace settlement itself.n Wilson, continued, giving

s~me

details which later came to be called his five points re-

presenting this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to
peace. They were, brieflyr

(1) No discrimination between those to whom we

17
wish to be just and th08e to whom we do not wish to be just.
~nts

(2) NO" settle-

to the special. interest of some nations that were not consistent wittl the

camnon interest of all.

(3) No alliances within the League.

(4) No selfish

economic combinations and no economic boycotts except at the direction of the
League as a. means of discipline and control.

(5) Complete publicity of all in-

ternational treaties and agreements.
It was a new

d~

that Wilson looked torward to w'ith confidence. ne

did not desire a c<:q>lete break trom the past, but
If\'le

~

an advance trom it.

still read Washingtonts immortal warning against entangling alliances with

full comprehension and an answer:l.nc purpose.

But only special and limited

alliances entangle, and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which
we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements
and clear the air of the world for common understandingS and the maintenance
of common rights. n42

All during thi8 period there vas little dissent .. aside fran the
speech of Senator Lodge quoted above, from the often reiterated purpose to or-

ganize a League tor peace detinitely at the conclusion of' the war.

No disa-

greement with the fourteen points was voiced in Oongress. 43
This was probably due to the absorption

or

the leadors ot the

0ppo-

sition in an effort to create a war cabinet which would take the conduct of
the war

la.rge~

trom the hands at the President. In July, 1917 an

at~

was

made to create a joint committee of both houses of Congress to assist the
President. This movement was succeeded by a campaign led by Colonel Roosevelt

--

42 New York Times, Sept. 28 .. 1918.. pt. 12, p. 1.
43 David Lawrence, I!!!!!!! St0!l .2! Woodrow Wilson, 23,.

•
to head a war cabinet to conduct the 'War. First he attacked the President .in
magazines declaring that
mocraC)'."
lUS

"It#~

did. not go to war to make the world sate for de-

In Chicago, Detroit, New York and other great cities he continued

attack denouncing the idea

or

a "soft peace" that the President might

favor. hh
Mr. Roosevelt's great personal fol.l.owi.ng stimul.ated him until

~

members of Congress concluded that on.J¥ a coalition cabinet with Roosevelt in
charge as munitions head would meet the situation.

the Democratic Chairman

of Senate Military Affairs Committee, Senator Chamberlain" joined the move.
ment, which culminated in a great luncheon in New York C1V on JanU&17 19,

1918, held in honor of Senator Chamberlain and. Represcmtat.ive Kahn of
California and attended tv' nineteen hundred people, where l>tr. Chamberlain declared that the

militar.Y' establishment had fallen down because or wholesale

inefficiency.4S
The leaders of tlle movement went to Washington where 1.fr. Chamber-

lain introduced bills creating a Munitions Department and. a War Cabinet of

three men.

t1r. Roosevelt personally led the fight tor their enactment. The

President weathered the contest, even ask:i.ng tor himself greater powOJ'S than

it was proposed to

,i

VII

to others. Wilson won one of his most striking suc-

cesses, in spite of the opposition of a number

..

or

embittered Senators in h18

•
)Wll

19

party.

This contest made certain a tremendous attempt of the older social
~orces

in the North to regain control of Congress in the following November.

;hese classes representing the great industrial wealth
;rown to look upon control as their prerogative.

or the country had

Mr. Wilson, as the zepre-

lentative of the equally old social classes of the agrarian South and of the
lewer life of the West, seemed to them an interloper. The President's amasLng program of action had transformed the scheme of things they were accustom3d to; the new tariff, the new banking system, and most of all the revolution

Ln Federal taxation coming in with the income tax had affected their interests
ieeply.

And now he was in a fair way to prove that the "provincials" he had

;athered around him could manage the greatest national and business effort in
)UT

history without official Republican aid.
In addition, he talked of a new international order and said re-

)eatedly that our power would never be used again to aggrandize a:rry selfish
lnterest of our awn on this continent or elsewhere.
People dread changes and he promised to make as many in the interlational field as he had in domestic affairs.

Most disturbing

or

all, his

rourteen points seemed to point to a new world order in which there would be
tendencies toward free trade.

And final.JJ, i f political control was to be

regained it must be done soon. Wilson and the social classes he represented
aad

won four straight elections.

It would have been equivalent to political

suicide for the opposition to approve Wilson; and great party groups do not
commit suicide, however seriously individual leaders

may take the current or

20

46

events. There was nothine else but a party struggle for the autumn •of 19l8.

46 Ibid., 262-26
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CHAPTER II
TliE PROORAH CH1\LLENGED IN THE SEtlA'l'E

Dissent from the high a:1ms

or

the war had been almost negll.g1ble up

to this time, but as the Congressional oampaign of 1918 approached its cloae
Hr. Roosevelt telegraphed to Senat.or Lodge and others, on October

25,

that the

Prelident's Fourteen Points were "thorough.ly mischievous" and 'Ilrfl"Xi the Senate
to declare against them "in their entirety.n2 The President replied the next
dq' with bis famous appenl which he bad long considered advisable.

A few

~

later the Republicans carried the senatorial election in five states by narrow

majorities and won a majority of two in the Senate, incl.uding the YOtes

or

Senator La Follette, who was practically outl.awed from the party, and Senator
llewberry whose seat was challenged from the tirst and later made untenable. 2

It is futile to argue what would have happened it Wilson had not

made an appeal to the voters. He might have concelvabq lost even more support it be had not t akcn this action. There is
A~.inistra.t1on

n~

in the mid-term Congressional eleetio.'lS, and this was to be ex-

pect,ed in 1918, particularq since the end 0of' the war
\Olell worth noting that numbers
'ltiith

a swing against the

or Democratic

W88

in sight.

It is

Representatives were delighted

the assistance that the President. a appeal would presl.Ull&bly give them.

1 Lawrence,.'£2! ~

359-360.

storz .2! 'Woodrow Wilson,

236.

2 David Houston, Eis!!t Years With Wilson's Cabinot, New York, 1926,
f

2l

•
Perh.aps Wilson's greatest m1st.Qke was wording
narrow~.

~he

statement so bluntly and

80

He might better have followed the advice of several of his Cabinet

members and asked tor a Congress, both Democratic and Republican, which would.
support him •.3

On November 18, 1918, two weeks atter the election, Wilson startled.

the nation with the announcement that he was going to Paris as the head of the
American Peace Delegation. A cry of protest went up frool the President.s

critics, chiefly partisan Republicans. Colonel Roosevelt announced. that the
President had. no right to speak tor the American people at this time.

"His

leadership had been repudiated by' them. •• at the last Congressional election•••
He is President •••Ue is a part of the treaty ma1d.ng paver. but he 18

ot1l1'

a

part."b Rooeevelt and his followers alleged that the President could use his
enormous 1nf'luence to
resentatives.

men

better advantage by' acting through instructed rep-

In America, Wilson would be able to make decisions

c~ and

unhurriedly, removed fran personal pressure, and in tOllCh with American opin-

ion. Regardless of criticism and so-called advice Wilson decided. to go.
The country -

at least the Republicans -

on November 29, 1918, when the personnel

announced. The delegates were to

received another shock

or. the American Peace COIlIllI1ssion was

be Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing,

Colonel House, General Tasker Bliss, and Hen17 White, an outstanding career

diplomat.
.3 Baker, W,oodraw Wilson, VIII,

.513-,14.

4 Howrton,!:laM Years, 3.59-360.
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Two ot the tour selections were a snY"nrise.
The choice of Sec--..--..
-I:'
••
Lansing was natural beca.use he had been a ta1th.tul and efficient assistant.

Colonel House had long been the President.s most trusted. adviser. He bad

been in Europe during the war and was at the l'IKmlent in close confidential
touch with allied leaders. House could be depended upon to support every

effort. to prevent the reconstruction
Th~

allianoes.

or Europe

on the old basis of' rival

most reasonable, the rema:i.ning two appointments were not.

so expected. General Bliss, who was also in Europe with a vide knowl.ed.6e at
cond1tions and. leaders, mil1tar,y and. othcrw1se, was an able soldier 'Who wu
in no senee a ndlitarist.

He could be counted. on to lend his .full weight to

a. supreme effort to give the world effective leaal and pacifiC means of' settl..
1ng its d1sputes.

In many wB3S the selection of' Henry' White was the moet ideal at all

He bad had service and

mew the

__ of clashing national interests and de-

sires which we call European politiC8 as perhaps no man in the country did.

He would be invaluable in Paris. Furthemore, White bad the rec<:lNWldatiOl1
of close friendship with both Roosevelt and Lodge.

Lodge

was pleased by hUt

appoiDtment to the Peace CaIIld.asion. Roosevelt was delighted.>

The appointment

.t White, however, was

much condemned.

Root, prominent and active Jlepubl1cans would have labored
Wilson

tor

the ldn.d

or peace

Taft, and

88 layal.ly u

he wanted and for the organiKtion to preserve

it. Each had a strong and. sincere desire to advance the cause of' world peace

S Allan Nev1ns, Tt~ Years
'l"eetimon1al page.

!!: AtnerlCal

D1~, New York,

1930

The Senators were offended tor two reasons.

F~rat,

•
WilBon had. not cOllSul:t.ed

them in advance) and second, unlike McK1nl.ey, be had not selected a single
member from their ranl.."8.

It was fortunate in no ser.ase of the word tor Wilaon

and his program that be did not find it desirable or possible to deter to the

senate.6
yet it seems reasonab13 clear, wit.'l politics reconvened, that what-

ever Wilson did would have been subjected to strong criticism traD the
Republicans. He was the

~

Democrat since Andrew Jackson to serve two

C(Ila

sooutive terms, and he had pushed throuGh Congress an eDCttmsive program of

domestic reform. This had proved exceed.ingly distastetul to the big bws1neea
interests, which were ch1et'l3 ltepublicans, and the.Y were detendned to bring
about a return of the good old. dlqa of laissez tain. If t,he Pl'ea1dent were
tri~t~

to dictate a liberal peace to the world his prestige would be

so grea:t. that be might accept a third. term. The opposition believed tbat
Wilson. must be c8feated at all costs.7
Wilson sailed fran }OJev York on December 4, 1918, and on the lhth

received a tumultous recept.ion in PariI.J. 8 Delirious throngs turned out to
cheer tbis American Savior wbo had helped. to defeat the Germans, and who

seemed to promise a period of happiness. He would draw up a just peace,
wnlch of course meant grinding OeX'Rl8ll1' to the very duet. Clemenceau said,

-

6 Ibid., 347-348.
7 Dodd, Woodrow WUson ~ ill.! Work, 268-269.

8 James ThompSQQ Shotwell,

!l. ~ Peace

C~nrerence,

New York, 1937.

..
I knew Paris 1n the glitter of the Second Bmpire. I thought
I knew ~ Paris nowI but I did not believe she could show such E!l'lthuslasm as this. I dontt believe there was ever an;ything like it
in the history of tbe world.9
While waiting tor the conference to convene, tbe President joumeyed to
England, where he vas warmly hailed, and. to Itaq, were the demonstrations
of blind devotion to "Voodro Veelaontf were indescribable.

One workingman de-

They srq he thinks of us the poor people, that he wants us
all to have a tair chance, that he is going to do sometbina When
he gets here that will make it impossible tor our government to
send us to war again. It be only had CCI'll8 soonerS I have alreadr
lost !) two sons. Do you believe he is strong enou.gh to stop all
Wars?

The tirst tormal meeting of' the Ccnt'erence vas held on J8l'l\ltll7 12,
1919.

On tbia

him sed.ous17.

verr day the President

suttered a loss

or

prestige t.hat burt

The t1rst of his Fourteen Points had declarec1 tor "open

nants openly arrived at."

c~e

It bad been phrased in opposition to secret

treaties:l secret alliallCes, to the whole system of secret diplomacy that seemed

to have brought on the war. I t seaued tunc:iamental to the President to

drag international business i1lt.o the light

or

day.

Tbat was, therefore, his

tirst proposal.

Amerioan IU'M!lpapers alone had sent about one h'Wldred and ti!ty

or

their most able correspondents to report in great detail how the peace vas
made. The door was barred

aca1mrt theae eager reporters,

and at the end

9 London Daily MaU, as quoted in Fleming, United States and

Leae~.2! Nations, 67.

10 Baker, Woodrov Wilson VIII,

-

,SaS.!86.

or
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the first cia¥ a secretary

alllJ~)od.

•
out and read to them a. dry' five line sum-

mary. The tremendous outcl¥ of the correspondents was beard throughout the
world. ll The American nEM!Jpaparmell sent a. vigorous protest to the President
which he put before th,e Conference and. supported, but with little result.12
The Peace Conference had not. been a.t work very long when it was

discovered that the hundreds of delegates of the twenty-seven Allied and
Associated Powers gatbered in plenary seasion made too unwieldly a group for

effective work. The Supreme Council or the CouncU of Ten was theretore d.eIt was composed ot the two ranJd Dc;

signated to do the most 1mportatlt work.

delegates from each

or

the five great powera, Great Britain, France,

Japan, and the United states.
to the

I~,

Its decisions were reported from time to time

plenaJ.7 oonference for final action.
The CouncU of Ten itaelf' proved to be too cumbersome and too

leaky a b~, and in March, 1919, it gave
If

Big Four".

WB'{!

to the CouncU at Four, of the

This consisted of President Wilson, DaYid Ll.o;yd George, Prime

!11ni8ter of Great Britain) Georg_ C1emenoeau, President of the COWlCil of

Franae, and Vittorio orlando, Premier at

I~.

Some of the t.i.r.ae it was the

CounoU of Three, tor orlando was frequently absent. The t.'lree leaders held
the destiny of t.he world in tbeir hands.
Whatever the oourse adopted, it was evidently the part of wisdaD

to grapple with the moat urgent pl"Obl.au first. In the

.ar~

&\VS

of the oem-

terence the victors proposed dividing the booty, Germaa.yts oolonies, perhaps,

1922, 1.38.

11 Baker, Wood.rOw Wilson and the World. Settlement, I, t1_ York,

12 Ibid., lJO.
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•
the least pressing major problem. Australia, .New Zealand and the Union at

.

South Africa were insistent for they had not only played. an i:rportant part in
conquering them, but were anxious to remove future German naval and m1lltar,y

bases. A.fter a. bitter fight, Wilson suecesst'ulJ¥ resisted a division along
old imperialistic lines.

Instead be was able to secure acceptance of the

principle upon wideh the mandate system of the League of Nations was ultimately based.13

In W1lson's eyes the drawing up of the Covenant of' the League of
Nat.ionsto insure a just and lasting peace, was the most important work of the
Canterenee. But the Allied apoteeman

88

vell as the Republicans at home, in-

sisted that the more pressing the problem of tne peace settlement be d1sposed

ot first

and that the League

ing less than a triumph

or

Nations be organized atteJ'Wards.

It vas noth-

tor him when the Conference voted, on JanuaI7 2$, 1919

that the League of Nations be an integral part at the treaty.
WUson, himself, was appointed chairman of the CCI1IIdsaion to draft
the Covenant of the League of Nations. He held night sessions beginning
Febl'W'S17 3, until he saw a. draft of' a league

covenant aceepted

by the Conte:r-

ence ten days later. The resultW8S hardl,y the artistic product which SO&I8
of the proposed canterences contemplating a year's deliberation might have

produced, but on Febru.ary 14, 1919, Wilson appee.red. before the Conference in
plenary session and triurophantJ¥ read the cQlQpleted League Convenant.14

lJ LL9Yd George, l~emoir& of the Peace Oonference, I.
1939, 121, .342,-343, 3$9-360.
'- ,
1928, $63.

!,Jew Haven,

14 Da.vid Hunt.er Miller, I!:! Drafts 2! .!:!!! Covenant, II, New York
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In the meantiIlle, the President. s opponents, filled witb a. real

fea.r that Wilson would succeed in creating and that they would have to kill
the peace trea.ty in order to destroy 1t, bad decided that a determined drive

to prevent its creation was in order. They believed it would be best to do
this through a plea tor postponement. A

conferenc~

was beld between Lodge

and Roosevelt's groups at Roosevelt's bedside in Roosevelt Hospital when the

two 1.rlarr10rs decided to attack whatever League proposal the Pres:1dent might
bring home with so many emendment8 and reservations that part,icipation by the

United States on the terms agreed upon by the President and tlle other powers
might be ei'reot1ve];y checked. The political consequence of permitting the
President to have the credit for leading us into the League of Nations might
be disastrous. All that had been won in the election of 1918 might be lost

in 1920.15
Lodge and his party believed that, 1£ in submitUng the charter

to the Senate Wilson would be presented with a set of terms that be could not
accept without great loss of prestige he would be too stubbom to submit the
crowning achievement

or his

career

to su.zmna.ry treatment at their hands. Lodge

had cooled to the idea of a league and Roosevelt had. agreed with him that the
thing would be a war breeder rather than a peace maker.

The main point of the plan

or opposition

purpose mentioned in all the President's addresses -

15 Baker,

was to amend the Single
that all the members

Woodrow Wilson ~.:!:l! World Settlement, 218.
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of the league should have tb.eir territories and political. independence guar-

anteed against aggress1on. This was the cornerstone of the plan. All the
~ork

of the League to Enforce Peace, and. all. the Pres1dent t s thin1d.ng, pointed.

the

to

CotmnOll

guarantee of the safety of each. Before Article X. was written,

the 0't>pos1t1on set its face against the bas10 idea on which the struoture was

to be reared and never swerred fram its purpose to nul.l.1ty 11'..
Could the American people be aroused to support the deteat
~dea of

or the

a league of peace? Yes, the thing to do was to call it an entangling

ialliance, stand on l<lashington'8 Farewell Address and show by countless hypotl18tical oases that American troops might, in this contJ..ngency or that, have

rt,o be sent to the ends of the earth. The idea of having the boys at home was
!very popular. It could turther be shown, moreover, that we would be in con-

rt,inual danger of being outvoted in the league by the small states i t equal :re~resentation

~be

was given or by colored raC3ea i t population were to be the basis.

outcry against the votes of the Br1tish Dominion in the ,A,ssembly was a

p,ater refinement

of the original idea.

At the same time an equal number of tears of 1nter.ferenoe in

Mterican affairs oould be aroused. It would be easy to show that the Monroe
Doctrine was endangered and mill10ns
sacred Doctrine was would

rue

whO only d!:"J.y

understood what that

to defend 1t. other large groups oould be

_",_eel by the old danger of the poss1bility of immigration being .forced
1lS,

and the new one of the danger of tar1tts be1ng attected.

upa'l

In short, i f

lenour.h questions could be raised, the people could be convinced. that instead
~t

being a league for peace, the thing was

re~

a dangerous breeder at dis-

)0
•
cord or var.16

on December 19,

Senator Lodge announced in the Senate that on the

21st he would address the Senate It on the question of peace and the proposed
league of nations,17 Hia speech

or

the 21st was a long one. It began by

asserting the right ot the Senate to advise as well

88

consent and quoted

maqy instances where the President had asked the advice

declared that now it was the solemn and i%!{Jerative duty

or the Senate. He
or the Senate to give

the advice that had not been invited. by' the negotiators.
We cannot compellntormation but we are abundantly able to
make our opinions known not only to the President. but to the Allies,
who have a Yery acute and olev idea or the power of the Senat.e in

regard to treaties. They must know that the Senate oan and otten
has rejected treaties. others, the senate has refused to ratif'y and
held without action. The Allies should not be held in the dark as
to the views or the senate.18
The groundwork for the tuture campaign was being la1.d. The senate
was not to respond. to requestD tor advice made by the PresidentJ it was to influence the negotiations oontr2l7 to

biB

deail". as fully a 8 apecches in the

open Senate ooulc1 do so. The drive for postponement ot the league was to be
pressed, and in case it and othor attempt.s to control the counse of the negotiations failed, the country and the

Alli~

should understand that the treaty

would be drastica.l.q handled in the Senate.

Tbe Senator proceeded to outline in detail the territorial settlements that should be made and to demand heavy indemnities, not only tor
vessels sunk, but tor a part at least of our war expenditure. Some methods,

-

16 Fleming, United States

.!!'2 ~ LeY'!!,

72-76.
t'.
17 Congressional Record, 6.$ Congress, lrd Session, Dec. 19, 1918,
;)7, pt. I, Wasilington, 1919, 672.
18 Ibid., 724.
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not named, lIUSt be taken to safeguard the new nationa •

.

Concen:d.zlg tbe Fourteenth Point, we were all lovers ot peace,
But we ought to be ctreme~ careful that in our arforts to
reach the millenium of urJ.vcr:.JaJ. and eternal peace, we do not create
a system which w1ll breed dissensions and wars. It 18 difficuJ.t to
du.scuss it at this time because no definite plan of any kind has
yet been put forward by an responsible person•••It is easy to talk
about a league of natiOns, hut the hard, practical demand is, 'Are
you ready to put your soldiers and your sailors at the dispositiaa
of other nations? • .Are we read;y to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and
to leave it to other nations to say how American questions should
be settled and. what steps we shall be permitted to take in order
to guard our own safety or to protect the Panama Canal? Are we
read¥ to have other nations tell \la by a majority vote what attitude we must assume in regard to iDlnigration or in regard to our
tariffs? These are lesser pOints, but they must be met and answered before we commit ourselves to pemittinc an association ot
nations to control 1n any decree the forces of the United States.19
The Senator's cry was repeated by the 't/as!:!PJ;tol! ~ in an edi-

torial, "No Soyereign Wanted" on December 23rd. The same day found Colonel
Harvey mak1.ng a speech in New York, nNo League of Nations to Enforce War."

Quoting Washington's Farewell Address extensively and lauding the Honroe

Doctrine, be demanded. that the Allies should deal with Germml7 attar the
United States collected our 1nder.m1ties troa her.

OUr object in entering the

war thus accompllshed, the peace oanf'erence might before adjourning turn the

league ot nations question over to international comm:1ssions, for i.nveatigation and report to the powers for "such treaty and action as they might. de-

sire.1I20

19

Ibid.

20
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A dispatch published in the Kansas 9itZ.2!:!t on December 22. reporled. that Senator Knox's speech

or

December 18 had been published in the

PariS papers and was bd.ng widely discussed.

The AMerioan delegation teared

it would enoourage European opponents of' the League to active OP1Josit1on to
the whole idea.

On

Christmas day Paul Scottt1aurar wrote that, particularl\v

before the President.s arrival in Paris t the speeches ot such men

a5

Colonel

HOO6evelt. Senator Lodge and Senator Knox were widely reproduoed to prove
that

~1r.

Wilson had lost the people's support.

on

the other band" he contin-

ued, "President UUson1s reception in Paris proved to be a signal tor a great.
awakening throughout Europe as to the tremendous issues

apparent that Mr. Hilson was not

~

at peace •••It became

accepted by the liberals througbout.

Europe as their natural leader, but that he was looked to tq the inarticulate
masses as their Spokesman and guide in the struggle to end wars
By Januar,r

torwer.,,21

1, 1919, Taft had ooncluded that it was not too DI&1Oh to sq

he (W1lacm) 18 stronger with the peoples
than are the respective premiers

or those

or

tha.1;

Great Britain, France and ltaQr

cotintrics. 22

Mr. Wilson may have been strong with the people

was destined. tor a struggle on both sides Q£ the ocean.

ot EUrope, but he

13e£ore leav1nc Paris

for home, Wilson sent a cabled invitation to the House and Senate Comm1tteea
coneemed with foreign affairs, asld.ng them to dine with him at the White

"louse and discuss the Loacue of Nations. He alao requested that Congress re-

21 Ibid.

22 !bid•• 81.

frojA

trca

debating the subject until hie

arr1~:~:~':~ _

(U

the high seas the Senate arwung into action. The President.s request tell on
uns;Y'lllpathetic ears. particul.a.r13 When be pro',tJosoci to laM at Boston and make

a speech or two on the subject before reporting to them..
Senator Poindexter

~

Washington opened the attack on Febl"U8Z'7

comparing the proposed League to the dreaded Soviet Government

ot Russia aDd

labeling it as the most ent.angl1ng am permanent alliance conceivable.
would

COIlpel

19.

It

the United Stated to participate in the ware and controversies

ot every other nation

and assume

arr:t burdensome

mandate over distant territ017

that might be asslgned to it. It did not accept

arrr Bubjects trom arbitr6-

tion and it even surrendered. to other nations the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations.23

Senator Borah bailed lt as the greatest tr1wnph tor English diplomacy in three centuries and Senator Reed, Democrat ot 11iasouri, expatiated on
the entire Dr!tish domination at tbe earth which was set up. lIe excoriated
the whole ot the Covenant, t1nd.ing unbelievable things in almost every art.j.c1e
We would be t old, tor example, that "you shall ha.ve an ar1l\V of a certa:1n alH'"

••• "VesselB

or

a certain number"... and we could not exceed such numbers

ll"Without going to Europe and asld.ng the graciOUS permission of eight gentle-

men, six ot whom proba.bq cannot apeak our language, and who bave likely

never set foot upon our shores'" Then an "'international smelling ccmnittee'"
would \:e around to inspect our industries adaptable

4l20.

to warlike purposea. We

23 Congress1onal Record, 6Sth Congresa, 3rd Sess1on, 1919,

•
could not even aid an Irish or Canadian rebel.l:ion and we should have t.o fight

8l\Ybod¥

who did. 24

Senator Lewis of Illinois, replied on February 23, that i t the

Council could so dictate ourtWenses 1t could destroy British Naval Supremacy
and 1ts members would have plenty of incentive to do so.

The votes of the

British Dcm1n1on, instead of being a danger to us would be in support on aD1'
questiori8 of :i.:mm.1gration which the league did not have poIIer to regulate 8lV"-

wq. As for its main purpose the very existence o! the mutual guarantee 11'l
Article 10 would prevent, most

lW'S.2$

When the President reached Boston on the same day he tound two

groupe o:t his friends awaiting him, one to counsel a sinpl.e explanation of

the League and tile other to urge a fighting speech accepting the cbal.lenge of
his opponents.

Each group was satisfied with one half of his speech.

plained the Covenant

.i"ilp~

He ex-

in the first halt and declared in the latter halt

that his fighting blood was stirred. He had no doubt Where the American
people stood on this issue.
The historic gathering of the Senate and House COIIIIIittees took

place at the White House on the even1ng

or. Febl"Ua1'y 26, 1919.

The Conference

brought into prominence another of' the small group of men who had determ1ned

to block Wilson in his createst endeavor at all costa. A strong, intense
man, later a suicide, Senator Frank M. Brandigee of Connecticut, subjected. the
President to keen cross examination upon the terms of the Covenant which in

24

COllb'Te8sional Record, 6,Sth Congress, lrd Session, 1919,4120.

2,S Flemjng,
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bis opinion left Wilson in a vel')" bad light ~eed.

Speaking to the

l!!! !2f.!

-

Sun the next day, be said, "I feel as if I had been wanderl.ng with Alice in

l'londerland and bad tea with the Mad Hatter." Lodge testified also that "The
president seemed a.ctually befuddled about l118!\Y' important points" and Knox w110

had posed his share

or

the lawyer questions to the l>t-esicient, agreed in

equal.ly strong language.26

-

The correspondent from the Sun could obtain little information

immediately after the conterence, but after the Senators had. an apportunity
to compose notes some of the results were amazing. The President had stated
"with tinal1t1" t

"That the United. States must surl"8nder vital points of sov-

ereignty, Chinese and J&l>anese exclusion goes out of American control into the
bandS of the league oontrol. Ireland is to be left to the mercies of Englan&i

-

The Sun insisted

t1lt~t

Knox, Lodge, Bnmdegee, McCumber and Hitchcock aU

"agreed that the President actually made these statements."
ately denied the truth of
of the

~

of the much vouched

Hitchcock immedi-

tor statement from the floor

Senate, and McCumber made it emphatiCally clear, the.t he had no cora-

nection with the effort to thus ridicule and. falsify the President's effort
to satisty the Senators.

Lodge, K.naJc and 231-"andigee kept silent as to their

conpl1city.
The response to the ?resident's explanation of the Covenant :ind1-

26 Coqgressional Record, 6;; Cong., .3 Seas., 1919, 4528-29.

-

27 Ibid., 1629-30.

•
cated that no scruple would stand in the vErI

of

t.he effort to disoredit him

and convince the country that he had betrayed it. Nothing could be more fair.

however, t..tw:n the recorda lett by sane ot the Republicans who attended the
Conference. Representative John Jacob Rogers,

or Massachusetts,

ranld.ng

Republican in the House Foreign Relat10na Ccxrn1ttee, wrot.e to Henr.y 'V1hite,

Mal' 3, 1919, as tollows t
The White House dinner a week ago tonight was a most interestillg one, and in most respects a raemorable ••• He submitted himselt to quite rigOl'OU8 cross ar:wuation tor t,vo hours, 8lI8Ver1Dg
.wary question easy or difficult, as f~ as pcesible andwith
apparent candor •••There vas no sugeestion of militant arrogance
about. him•••Ha showed a good general familiarity with the document
itselt-ot -which, by t.he watf be did not have a copy at. fJ1.l'7 t.ime
betore him during the t\~"O houro--but r think scarcely had a better
perfect knowledge ot saue ot t11e minor details. I do not aq t.h1s
in cnticism, for IV impression was that be was as t.horougl:~ versed as he need have been, or 1ndeed could roasQllab~ haVe been expected to 1:8. But some of the Senators t.bere that night thought
however, that he was not at all adequately informed. As I said, DV
own impression was quite the oppoaite.28
The President's conference with the Foreign Relat.ions Camn1.ttee, on
Februa.ry 26, did not change the m1nds
b

ab~

or

many of the Republican members. Pro-

its most important incident was the President' 8 statement that he did

not think the Covenant could be mu.ch amended owing to the ditriculw of securing the concurrence

Two
and mlnut.ely.

~

ot the otb.er nations.
later Senator Lodge questioned the Covenant

thor~

At the close of the speech he c OQCluded that tbis machinery

would not promote the peace of the world, but would bave a directl¥ opposite

37
effect.

•
His main effort, however, was to counsel that every item should be

.

investigated with utmost thoroughness and weighed with the greatest care.
All he asked

viaS

On

consideration, time and thought.29

the same day Senator Lenroot, of Wisconsin, made a straight-

forward plea for amendment.

He approved the general plan as proposed and

hoped to be able to Tote for it.30
Sex:a.tor Knox's attack, on Harch 1, was massive and complete.
fining and assuming the League to be
down

&

De-

super-state he presented it as striking

the precopts of our Constitution, destroying our sovereignty and threat-

ening national independence.

~I

then, this plan to strangle and crush us?

iWhat was the hurry? War l1as farther away than it had been for centuries.,,31
SOLle minutes later the league was presented by Senator Sherman of
Illinois, as a "Pandora's box of evil ta empty upon the American people the
aggregated calamities of the world."

It was an oligarcilJ that would tteznbargo

our commerce, close our exchanges, destroy our credits, leave our merchandise
rotting on our piers, shut the Isthmian Canal, order Congress to declare war,
levy

ta.~es,

appropriate money, raise and support ar.m:i.es and navies lt • • • It was

the "death knell of the P.merican Republlc •••. a :fantastic idealism, a

po~glot

philanthropy as vain as the rea.lms o:f world philosophy and morals as it is

-

29 Ibid., 4529.
30 C0!lk7l'essiona1 Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919, 4569-72.
31 Ibid., L687-95.
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impossible in peaceable execution.,,32

At the conclusion of this speech, Senator McCumber took the floor
lest the impression go out that the Republican Party as a whole
to the league of nations.
even in assailing it.
of the structure.

W~

opposed

The critico of the league ignored its purposes

Article 10 he regarded as the very foundation stone of

He challenged any Senator to give a clearer and more con-

cise declaration of an agreement to preserve peace. Altogether one must be
led far afield indeed by his prejudices to conclude that we were compelled to
submit our domestic affairs to every nation in the world which questioned a.rry
of our internal policies. The Covenant could not be condemned on scattered
phrases.

Honesty was needed in the discussion).3
Senator McCumberts protest, however, did not prevent the following

declaration from being read into the Record by Senator Lodge on the last dq
of the session, March

4, 1919. It

was signed by thirty-seven Republican

Senators and Senators-elect, more than one third plus one necessary to defeat
the treaty.

The most striking passage of the ultimatum reads

Resolved •••That is the sense of the Senate that while it is
their resolve and sincere desire that the nations of the world
should unite to promote world peace and general disarmament, the
constitution of the league of nations·in the form now proposed. to
the peace conference should not be accepted b"-.f the United States
and be it
Resolved further, that it is the sense of the Senate that the
negotiations on the part of the United States should be immediately
directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of nego-

.32 Ibid.,

4865-4867.

33 Ibid., 4872-4887.
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tiating peace t.erms with Ge:rmaqy satisfactory to the United States,
and the nations with WhOOl the United. St.at(!s 18 associated. in the
war against the German Government, end that the Pl'O}>osal for a
lee.t,ru.e of nations to insure the peace of the wor;Ld sbould be then
taken tiP .for careful and serious consideration.J4

The iJew York Sun reported.

---

As the Nassaohusetta Senator started to speak, realization
of the gravity of the step he was taking and that others were tek1ng under his guidance and leadership came to him. His voice was
stead3", but his hand, in which he beld the resolution he read fran

was sha.ldng perceptd~. As he finished. reading the list of names,
Mr. Lodge paused a moment, then qu1et~ le!'t tt.e haJJ 0: ":..~.a :Jenate.
There was not a sign or approval or of disapproval tro.;.t~the Senators
on the noor or from hundreds je..:'il!lCd in t.he salieries.J;;J
On the evening of the sa.me day the Round Robin was pttb:.i3hoo, the

President aaceptod. 'the cha.llenge in a 6,iJeech ill New York: City an he dc.parted.

for Europe again, saying that when the treaty came back, gentlem.en on tbis
side would ti.."ld the covenant "not
treaty tied to the

OOTenant

~,.

in it, but

80 ~

tl.reo.d.s of. the

that. you car...."lot d:J3sect tbe covenant trOll tlle

treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.n36 WilaOl'l api)::,~e.'ltl¥ did

not think that the Senate would dare incur the odium or rejecting tte enth-e
treaty.
~!r.

Taft supported the Presi(lent by deel.ar1ng :1.t to be his dutr to

insert. the COTenant in the treaty as ind1.9I,ensable to the peace sought. Ta..."t'l
strong support must have convinced the IiC"jJUbllC'aIl leaders th."lt the .President
would prevail.

Su.eh. conviction was needed. for during the President's

4881.
J's Dakar,

34

Ibid.,

Woodrow Wilson
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-

Ibid.., 305-309.
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the League had fallen into the background.

T~

British Conservatives had

rebelled almost as violently as their American contemporaries and many of the

Continental nations were quite willing to make the peace by old familiar methods, as the American Senate Republicans dematlded.

ot the President.s New York address, the

Even despite the warning

.League was gmeral.q considered dead

when Hr. ,Jilson lar¥ied in France again on !~h 14.37
It was sanething of a shook therefore, to read his statement of
the 15th that "the decision made at the Peace Conference at its plenary

session, Janu.ary 2S, 1919, to the effect that the establishment of a League
of

r~ations

ahould be an integral part of the Treat)" of Peace, 18 of final

force and that there is no basiS whatever for the reports that a change in
the decision was contemplated."

Thia again was plain speaking, and it produced wrathful eruptions

in conservative quartan on both sides of the ocean, but there did not seem
to be ar:t¥ iDlnediate vq of upsetting the decision, especially s1nce the Allies
had not been able to find II1J'3' formula aside l'tom the League which would solve
lI'lat\Y of the knotty problans.

So the Conf'&rence returned to

~

League and the President took

up the task, among many others, of amending the Covenant to aatisty its

American critics. He was under no illusions as to the possibility
ing a section of the opponents in the Senate.

or

satiaf"y'-

"No matter what I do," be had

said during the return voyage, "they will oontinue the attack."

But the ur-

37 Seymour and House, What REt!Hl U !ppeneci at Paris, Ne!rl York,
1921, 4l6-4l7.
-

•

gent requests of the Tart wing of the Republican pt,rtiy
by cable, and the a.dvice of his

tor revision continued.

own party leaders left him no choice but to

attempt. to meet enough of the objections .to secure ratitication in the Senate.
lIe was sure to alam the French and their allies a.t each suggestion ot weakening the

Oovenant, and his position in the Conference would be

oonsiderab~

weakened by the necessity of asking tor conoessions, but he must attempt to
secure the changes moat general.ly demanded regardJ.ess.38
The original draft of the League Oovenant had been so
throWn together that it bristled with detects.

them sincere

am

haat~

Critics in !merlea, many of

oonstructive, pointed to the desirability of amendment. They

stressed, particularq, the necessity of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, of
exempt10n of claaestic issues, and of p roviding

tor a method of withdrawing

from the League. Wilson finally succeeded in forcing the more reasonable of
the Amerioan demands into the Oovenant, but in so doing be weakened b1a hand
with the other

Powers, which insisted upon equivalent coneeasions.39

The chief' battle vas with France. Clemenceau's first demand was
reparation tor damages caused by the Germans. He second demand was tor securityagainst a repetition

ot the horror of 1931. The French desired either

1;0

occupy Ga1"1l8.l\V' to the Rhine, or to create a butter state. :aut the pl..a.ci:ng of

millions ot Germans under the French tlag would be a gross violat.1on of the
principle ot sel.t-cletermination. Against such an arrangement, Wilson tought

38 William Allen White,

~oodrow Wilson,

1929, 384.

39 Baker, Wilson ~ World Settlement, II, 43.

•
Clamenceau with all his soul, while the French press show'ered the American

.

idealist with abwu!.40 A compromise was tinall;)~rea.ched. France was to occupy
the Rhineland. for a maximum of f1fteen years, and the Saar Vall.ey for a l.ike

period. In return, Britain and. the United States were to sign a treaty with
France promising her armed assistance in the event of an "unprovoked" attack
by Ge~.

Alt.hough both Clemenceau and Wilson must have feared that the

United States would spurn such an entangling alliance-as it did _.this proposal

WUB

too attraotive for Clemenceau to refuse.Ll
The next crisis was when

I~

demarded Fiume, the only desirable

ocean corridor of the newl,y created state of yugoalav:l.a-a claim difficult to

support on a self-determination basis. Wilson appealed

t,o

the Italian people

for support causing thedWlgates to leave the Conference in anger. The delega.tes received 1.mrcted1atel,y enthusiastic backing from the populace and. Wilson

anathematized 'Where he had ehortJ.y been idolized. But be did win a hollow

victoI7 for self-determinat1on.
The Japanese

now took advantage of the Italian crisiS to press

their demands for German econaaic rir"hts in China's province of Shantung.
Britain had agreed. to support Japanese claims in Sbal tung and to the Qe:nnan
Pacific isl.ands north of the equator, in return tor Japanese support of
British claims to the German isl.ands south of the equator. W1laon feared. ..
Violation of sel£-determination if' Japan were given so strong a foothold.

40 Lodge, Wilson .!2! World Settlement, II, 43.

41 Ibid., lS7.

If,

•
however, the Japsnese as well as the Italians were to 'W"ithdraw fran the con-

.

ference, it r:dght collapse and the precious league might be lost.L2 So

tLleJl

yahoo reluctantly consented to a compromise by which the Japanese were to reta1n the economic holdings of Germwv and ultimately retum the peninsula to
China.

Japan also received, under a mandate, the German Pacitic islands north

at the equator. This whole arrange:1S8nt was expediency rather t.han justice-a disastraus blow to lillioo's prestige as the champion

or

aelt-d.eterm1nat1on.

The revised Covenant was published on A.pril 28 J the Treaty

or

Versailles was presented to the Germans on r1q 7, 1919. The Oer.maua were
given an opportunity to

st~

the bullQr document. They made bitter but futile

protests. In particular, they resented baving been dism:med
the Fourt.een Points and then hav1ng this peace
their throats.

or

b7

a promise of

imperialism. rammed down

At the Hall of 141rrors, Versailles, the German delegates

1:uctantl3' signed. the treaty, June 28, 1919.

h2 Baker, Wilson

~

World Settlement, II,

,01.
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THE FIGHT FOR THE TREATY IN ANERICA 1919-1920

The League was defeated in the United States, not because
it was a League of Nations, but because it was a Woodrow Wilson
League, and because the great leader had fallen and there was no
one who could wield his mighty sword.1
Whatever degree of success President Wilson may have achieved it
was great enough to cause gloom in the band of men who had determined to deny
him the oreation of a League of Nations.

The League had not onlJr been oreat-

ad but its Covenant had been amended to meet the principle American objections

raised against it. The entire Treaty of Peace was also completed and the
President would soon be returning with the finished doC1llltent containing the
League ot Nations so woven into its texture that it would indeed be impossible
to separ~te the two. 2
The Covenant had been so favorabl¥ received in the United states
that it seemed out of the question to defeat it d1rectl¥. A oonsiderable
body of opposition had been aroused and many doubts raised but the leadera
of publio opinion still stood overwhelm:i.ngly for the League.
Lodge realized that the leaders. of public opinion, bankers. and
capitalists were unanimously advocating the League as it had been written and
amended. There was only one recourse, that was to arouse the masses by the

1 T. W. Gregory (Wilson's Attorney General), 1925, as quoted in
Bailey. Diplomatic Histor,y. 667.
2
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pera1stent repetition of the cries alreq-

r~ed

and aI\V others that seemed.

likely to stir the emotions of the people. The nation, moreover, might be
wearied eventually of the whole leafj'Ue business 1£ action on it could be delayed long enough • .3
There was the time essence of the thing.

Lodge contacted Borah

and obtained his support on the discussion at the treat:y by way of amend.'TleDt
and reservation. Lodge' s plan was to ffprogre8a along tbe lines of protecting

the interests and sare1iy of the United States ...by amemments and reservat,ions

••• sc••• that. a large majority of the RepubliC.Ql18 could. vote for it." Borah
prom1sed cooperation but warned. him that in tJle end he would vote against the

treaty.4 This

\lWJ

a good bargain tor both lead.era. If it cOi.J.d be executed,

Lodge bad the certainty that

at the worst the Republican trademark 'Would

be

stamped on the League.'
Two requisites for success wenn control of the senate machinery
and tunds necessary to expand the campaign to arouse popular sent.ilaent against
the league.

The first requisite Lodge see."OOd certain

at,

but the second, was

a wony untU Senator Knox made an appeal to his Pennsyl"a.n1a friends, H. C.
Frich and Andrew Vi. Hellon.6

.3 George H&l."'V'ey, Herp:z.9:!t Frich..:!?!!! Marl, New York, 1928, 325.

4 Lodge,!!!! Senate .!!!!! ~ League .2! Natio.nl!,

-

S roid., 148.
6 Harvey, H!f1!l 9.!.!t f:t;1cp

~ ~·tan,

.325-26.

1l~7.

The money reservoir of the"Cabal!t becD.me both deep and full. The
second. r6quisite of success was at hand.
irreconcilab1es because

nCM

luajo1cing pervaded. the camp of the

"organized iffort" to arouse distrust of the

League would go forward an a nationwide scale backed by practicuJ.ly unlimited
funds.7
On Mq

19.

Congress met in a special seasion to enact the appro-

priation bills. a result of the Republican filibuster
ed to compel a special. session.

or t4arch 3

and

4, design.

On Mq 20, Senator Johnson, offered an unpre-

cedented resolution calling upon the Secretary of state to transmit the wU'inished business of the treaty to the Senate.8 The Senators were anxious to
begin work on 1t, though not in secret session as usual.

l1r. Lodge served

notice on the J2rd. that the document woul.d be treated ll1th "pitiless publi.
city.It

The Covenant bad been made "much

WONG

than be.f'ore. tt9

Article 21, reserving the !{onroe Doctrine, said that:
Nothing in the covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engage.'1lents, such as treaties of arbitration
or regional understandings, like tbe~ionroe Doctrine. for securing
the maintenanoe of international peaoe.10
But no! cried Senator Lodge on June

tional underst.a.ndingl

7, it vas never an

It is oursJ "It is all Our8J and now it is carried into

-

7 Ib1d•• 329-31.
8 Conf2!Ssional Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 1919, 63.

-

interna-

9 Ibid., 161.
10 Ibid., 791-2.
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urWl league of nations. It is

aJ.req.-

•

.

interpreted by England, althou.gh it

is whol.:q' our affair, and it is to be determined in the future by the League

The Senate having been organized by the Repuuiloans and the in1tial
broadsides loosed against the Covenant, the leaders proceeded to the all :t.m.

portant matter ot reorganizing the CODIIdttee on Foreign Relations J as Senator
Hitohcock charged, "the Republican leaders I filled the Coum1tt.ee on Foreign
Relations with Senators pract1oal.l.y pledged to op!)ose the League of Nations."

This charge vaa not replied to, other than by an eftort of Senat.or
Fall, of

~4ew

,tex:t.ct), to find out what determined the appointment ot Democratic

members to the CODIldttee, although senator

\\~ill:iams

asked Senat.or Lodge to

correct him "right now while I am on JlV teet" it he did not interA to malOll

the League a party issue. Ur. Lodge sa.t silent.Il
The prot,est aroused. against the league among businessmen and partisan Republicans stimulated b'tJ the opponents of the Ja &btUe created anxiety
in Taft, whioh he expressed before the New Y01"k Convention of

'~he Lea[,.'OO

to

Enforce Peace, sa;:ringr

fh:is is not a partisan question •••l{a should be for or agsi.."lSt
the League, witl!out regard to whether 'we think it will bring credit
to our partY' or cred1t to any man.

leaders was bearing fruit.

The porfectly

would have about the advisability

nattu~al

doubt tlk'lt

at a new- departure

~

Mool'ieans

ill foreign a.r.rail"'S

11 .Q..~ss1onal ~o~, 66 Cong., 1 Seas., 1919, 791-2.

lias

was beir.g stirred into sometJling much more act!ve. 12
A poll of the press, published lr.{ the ltiter:a!l Disoot on April.

5.

had shown that while the najority favored tl.te League as it stood, there was a
very large body of opinion that would support conditional ratification.

To

the question, do you f 3,vor the proposed League of Nations? 718 newspapel'S had
answered "Y cs", 181 "!~on' a.'1d 478 had. given conditional rer.e>liea. The likeli-

hood wu.s that the great lead L."ldicated for U'.te league could not be easily

come, i t at all.

""YW;'

Hence th.e slowness with which the Foreign Relations Commit'tei

If.Dved af."ter it received the treaty.

The strength of the feeling against the

League, and for it, on occasions of the President's connection with it, stood
out clear~, as did the.feeling stirred up by the Senate attacks.JJ
HeanwhUe the debate continued in t,he Je.rlate as to whether the pro-

posed Treaty of Peace should I:D published or not.

President Wilson cabled in

reply that he was unwilling to break his agreement with Allied leaders that
the treaty be not published until 81.gned.14 Senator Borah countered, on
June 9, by presenting a copy

or the unsigned treaty, procured. for

him by the

Chic50 Tribune, and forcing its publica.tion.
A

rw da:t-s

that the oopy

later the Senate investigating committee established

or t.he treaty seen by

,Hr. Lodge had passed from the hands of

}ir. Thomas W. La.-nont, financial adviser at PariS,

to

~.r.

H. p. Davidson of

12 ~., 899.

13 "Do Iou Ft.vor the Proposed
New York, W, April 5, 1919, 13-l5.

lh Baker,

Lea~"Ue

or

Nations," Lit.er!,!I D:1,!st,

Woodrow Wilson .!!! !Jorld Settlement., I, 1$7-160.

of J. P. Horgan and Compa1'l7, as head of the League of Red. Cross SoCieties,

'Who in tum had passed it on to !o!r. Elihu

Root.

who had shawn it to Mr. Lodge.

On June lO, Senator Knox introduced. one more resolution giving :n0-

tice to the Peace Conference that the treaty should be divorced from t.l1e
Leat'Ue.16 The new resolution pushed. the assumption of the Sonate t s right to
"advise" as tar as Senator Lodge himself' artel'WSl'd advanced it.

paragraph of the

1" esolution

The second

warned against an assumed attempt to amend our

constitution by passing the treaty', and the third expla.iMd with great care
just how the Peace Conference could give the Senate a chance to vote on the
Covenant separately.

Here was a concession which many JiMIOVle would

slq

was going fe:J'

enough. The obligation was whoJ.:q getleral and thus w.. absolutely nt>thir>-B

taken and a stake in the world's peace recognized. It

Wa:J

going too tar ;or

tor the Senate COOIIl1ttee on Foreign Relations however, Which reported the
resoJ.ution

witr~out

the last paragraph conta1.rling this proposal.

Even that

inde£inite commitment was too much for Borah. Lodge and Borah understood one
another.17
Tart.

reall~ed

ful.l;r the trend of these maneuvers and at once pro-

tested against them as strongly as he could. He maintained that the \11101e

15

"Opening of the 66th Congress,"

1919, I, ?t. 2, 54.

ClllTEfnt Hist0!Z1 New York,

.. •

16 Csressional ~fJtlO~; 66th Congress, 1 Session, 1919, 894.

11 pgngresslonal Reoord, 66th Congress, 1 Session, 1919, 14)0.

attitude ot the Senat.ors was contrary to RepuQl1cans trad:1.tiona.
Senator Xnax disclosed, however, on June 13, that be waUd tight
1"01'

his resolution to the end.

He did not know which the Peace Conterence

would tend toward, h18 ideas or his opponents, but at least the Senate

b~

would be cleared of blame tor deltq.18 A close look at Senator's notes and
Senator Knax:ts speech

or

June 11, in particular, would reveal the

Uvea to be time W arouse the country against

th~

~

objec-

League and justificntion

for taking it. Time to consider wu time to VJ.ea.
So consuming was the Cabal's determination to thwart the President
that no warnings would reach them. Thus Senator ficCumber appealed to them
quite

vainJ¥

on June lB, to take a long view, saying.

SpaWN, you may defeat the treaty •••But as surely as this
18 defeated and the world au!'f'ers another calam1ty, deeper tban
the hatred of the enetI\Y will be the hatred toward tb.e statesmen
of the world. who ha.ve tailed in their great opportunity to league
together to shield tbe poor, innocent beings trom such calamities
as r.ave boon visited upon tJlem because there is no law to check a
a great, powerful nation tram criminal aggression.19

N either did the pleas or Wluential members of their party move
them. The talk or a new round robin brought out the fact that a group or
twenty-eight prau1nent Republ1cana,

lawye~.

bankers and others of New York

Cit)r had protested to the Senate "that pol1t,ical partisanship should have no
place in tl1e consideration on the merits

League of

l~at.iona"'

18

or the Cansti tution ot t

and urged ntbat the treaty and covenant be

!L.!!!2!:! Times,

he proposed

promp~

June 13, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1.

19 £OflS!!!si~ Record, 66th Cong., 1 Sess., 1919, 1266.

rati-

fied. by the Senate without attempting to embaJ:.rass it by amendment." The

~

effect it produced was a vehement attack fI't'lm Senator Borah threatening that

it the Republican Farty did not make a pe..rty issue or the League of nations

a new party would be created to do so, while other senators ridicu.led the
statement as coming from tt'the Taft Crowd.tt20
The anti-leaguers had first pictured the League as dominated by
the kingsJ then it had been the BritishJ a little later Senator Reed had.
proved that we were likely to tall under the swq

or

the Negroes and other

colored peoples J nOW' Senator Sheman pointed to the Pope as likely to control.
the League.

Were not twenty-tour of the forty Christian nations in the League

"spir1t~

dclm1nated b'J the Vatican?"

No broad field of prejudice was left

uncultivated; nor were ~ smaller areas of rival antipathy overlooked.21

B:r June 21, it
be passed.

bee. . evident that 'the Knox resolution could not

On the same d.q fol'Jller Secretary Elihu Root appeared in the Senate

wing of the Capit~.

The result of a conference with his senator:Lal friends

was a change of tactics.

In a letter to Lodge he advised dealing with the

de.fecta of the Covenant in a qualifying resolution of ratification.

Atter

commending the Covenant, at length as containing fta great deal of high value
that the world ought not to lose" he advised (1) that consent to Article 10
be rcf'used, (2) that no quali.tication on the right to withdraw be accepted
and (3) that nothing in the Covenant "shall be construed. as to iMply a relln-

20

l!!! I2!:! Times,

June 22, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1.

21 CBDfFeuional. Record, 66th Cong., 1 Sess •• 1919,

l4.37.
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sition than he had enoountered 1n Paris. AS be embarked, a meeting in
Carnegie Hall addressed by a Democrat and a. Republican, Senators Reed and

Johnson, hissed his name and applauded a. man who shouted. that Wilson lms a.
tra.1tor.26 •

.

"tio human being, it seems," Si\Ys David Lawrence, who observed the

President t.hrough the Peace Conference, "oould have SUl"Viveci the mental strain
which rested upon Woodrow' Wilson d.uring the Pea.oe Conterence.n27

Now he had

to tace the bitter opposition organised against him at home.

The President's reception was as hearty as he could have wished.
He was treated to all the pomp. the t{avy and officialdom could ofter, but "the
greetings

sonds

or

that seemed to mean most to him

were the shouts m1 cheers

or

thou-

countr.vmen who lined the streets through which his automobile passed

on the way to Carnegie Hall."

The greatest demonstration in strength and vol-

ume came when be stood on the platform of Carnegie Hall and earnestly declared
that the peace was "a just peace which, it it can be preserved, w1ll safeguard the world. from. unnecessary bloodshed.n28

The sincerity of the President'a belief that the American people
and all peoples everywhere wanted a better ordered world in which 't.here would

be some safeguard against war has been little questioned, but he has been
accused of not representing the Irish. The President bad not forced the in-

'26 Ibid.,

-

Ju.~e

29, 191.9, pt.. 1, p. 6.

!9!.!!:2! sto;rz .2! Wilson,

27

.Lawrence I

28

!!!!!2tii T~.

267.

July 11, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1.
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dependence of Ireland and her admission to the .League.

•
Irish nationalism

might have been denied in Dublin and Paris .. but it was to have its day in New

York and vJashington.

rir. De Valera was acclaimed as ruler in tlew York two

evenings after the Presidentts return by a crowd

or

twenty-five thousand. At

this gathering there were hisses and boos at oach mention of the

r,JillilO

or

the

President of tile Un! ted States, t.he League of Nations, England and Sir Douglas

Hmg.
On July

lo, the dq following his return the President laid the

treaty before the Senate.

The address which accompanied its presentation was

an atterr.pt to explain the nature and necessity of' the basic setUements .. and
of' the League in part.icular. 29

the Republican Senators

wrj

The President's address, however, did not give

llght.

They had joined hea.rtJ.ly in applauding

the President as he entered, but at the conclusion of' the message the Tribw18'1
correspondent observed tbat three Republican Senators, McNary..
Kenyon clapped

mil~.

~{cCumber

aDd.

In statements afterwards.. Senator Brandegee said,

"Soap bubbles of orator.f and souffle of phrases."

t-iost of' the Republican

Senators tmited in deploring the the President did not answer any of t11e specific objections they bad agreed. to pross

~ainst

the League.

They felt that

their spec1£lc attacks should have been reeof:;ni.aed by repqJ Wilson

WaG

de-

termined not to d1gn1.t'y the thing he wanted to avoid.
After the President's address to the Senate, Republican leaders

-

29 Ibid.

5S

•

confeZTed in the cloak roan.

"'those attending included Senators Lodge, Borah,

Drandegee, Fall and HoCorndck.30 Further conterencea were held in rapid suc-

cession during the next few

d~.

Carter Field' s dispatch of July 12

atU'l0'Ul.lC:-

eel trult "Republican members of the Senate Foreign RelatiODS Committee dis-

cussed plans tor their fiCht on the peace treaty and the le&b'l'Ue of nations."
Tbe next day be reported that the "Republican lines were consoli.dated in a

dozen scattered conterences •••at the houses ot various Senate leaders. u )2
Senator Gore" Democrat ot Oklahoma, had visited Senator Lodge and announcad
his adhesion to the reservation program so that the reservation1sts neM' had

a majority in the Senate.,)'
What would under natural and normal. circumstances haw been the

opening speech in the entire debate on the treaty was made by Senator Swanson,

of Virg1n1a, on July 14J in a speech f'illing ten pages of the Record he

attempted to analyze the essential features of the Covenant and the objections
raised against it.

The bl'\l&rantee by .Article 10 of territorial integrity a.rd.

independence against external. aggression would act as a preventive

ot war as

it intended, not as a cause of' wars as critics maintained. What had. occurred
under the Monroe Doctrine furnished convincing proof' of this contention.

-

30 Ibid.

-!!!! l2!!

31 Ibid.
32

T1met!, Jul;v.

14, 1919,

pt. 1, p. 1.

33 u. S. Congress, Senate, C~onal ReCOrd~ 66th Cong.,
14, 1919, Vol. 58, pt. 3, ~on, 1919, 2 43-45.

1 Sess., J~

Swa."lSon stressed the deterrent power of

Art1ol~

10, and its detens1ve value

to us, but maintained that its authority was moral" not. legal.
The next

d~

the Shantung settlement was brought to the fore as

the iniquitous surrender of the great Chinese province to Japan, the Democrats

replying that

~

property rif.hts had been eiven and tbat Japan would keep

her proodse to hand political control to China.
Senator Colt, Republican, of Rhode Island, spoke for the Leat,'Ue
on Ju.ly

17,

and said he could see no super state in the CovenantJ it was

rather an association of tree nations. It asked no surrender of true nationalis:n When it substituted. a reign ot law for the reign ot force •.34 Senator
Pan.el"ene ot Ohio, then defended the constitutionality of the league and replied at length on the objections ~a1nst it.35 Senator McNary of Oregon,
continued the defense

OIl

July 22, hold.i.ng that Article 10 was a moral bond,

but the pillar section of the Covenant. The demwIld tor amendntent8 and res ...."; ...
tions, he thought, came without proper reGard for the results t..'1at would

tollav •.36 Senator Johnson at South Dakota, also could not see anytbing in

Article 10 that was dangerous. Senator }loscs or l'Jew Hampshire could aee
little th.at was good in the entire treaty.J?
Senator NcKellar quostioned

2721-2.

L~-ets

attitude. Lodge bad been all

34 Co:.E!ssional Record, 66 Cong.,t 1 Sess.,

JS

-Ibid.,

-

2927-85.

J6 Ibid., 296$-88.

37

Ibid., 2989-9.$.

J~

11, 1919,

for allied harmony.

now

that th.e All1es had

agreed

upon the treaty and. the

utmost harmony provaUed the onJ.y discoro,r.lut nO'1ie came .from Senator Lod.ge an.i
his associates.38 The speaker tben ado-slted the tactics

ot the opposition am

viewed for the Covenant which hud ever been o.ffered. He cbara.c'tarized the

resolution as an agreement ut.tw,t Europe cou.ld stir up all. t.b.a \1 ars ohe wanted
to and we would be tbe police-men to stop them." wl1th no !aachinel)" to keep
the peace provided, nit woul.d take 5' ,000,000 Arl1erican soldiers on guard in
E.'urope all the time to keep order and the greatest navy in the world."

l'tr.

HcKellar a1med to outdo the alarmists .39

After a speech in defense o£ the Shantung settlement by Senator
Robinson ot Arka.'1SaB on July 24, 40 Senator Lenroot, o£ vi1sconsin, Sl:>oke tor

reservations. He argued that since the Fourteen Po1nts had. not been ful.q
compUed with we were Ullder no obligation to accept the Treaty as signed by

the President. 'rhare was di.8agreement about the interpretations ot Article
10 and two or three otJ'lers.. therefore reservations would have

to be adopted

to remove the doubts. lu. Zach reservation, held Senator Pittman.. of !~evada,
on the same c:U.\Y, would have to be accepted by the trea.ty ratit'Jing power irl

every state signatory to the treaty.

MoreoVer, our exceptions would not stand

alOOOJ other disappointed pOWe!"9 would press for the th.ing:3 they had not 01>-

-

38 Ibid., 2997.
39 Ibid., 3022-32.
40 ~., 3092-96.

41

-

Ibid., 3~-90.

.

tained and the Senate WQ:lld have to accept their counter-reservations, distasteful though some of them would bo, J.f it got its own.

It was better to

reject the Treaty than to reopen contention.
Senator Borah agreed at once allowing that all reservations to be
agreed to by all signatories and granted tha.t legall\v Congress would retain,
without arrJ' reservations, its r:S.ght to declare war.

He was "not interested.

in any form of interpretations or amendments or reservations.'"

f'undamentaJ.l¥ right to enter this enterprise or fundamental.ly

It was "either

wrong."

He

thought it was wrong because it entangled us in European affairs and lessened.
our independenoe, but if it was fundamentally right he would not waste his
time with reference to t.'1e cbtails concerning it.42
Mr. Borah spoke inunediatel\v after Senator Smith of Arizona, who

-

--

had attacked the critics profession to be for a league, but not this one.
Why all the hypercritical interpretation of the terms of the cove-

nant he asked?

The Honroe Doctrine was just as nru.ch a promise to make war as

Article 10 was.

It. would b

A

a silly threat if it was not; it was just that

no one had. a.ttacked it as unconstitutional or c::>mplained that Congress was
deprived of its freedom of' action under it.

Moreover, our treaty with Panama

bound us legally to maintain the independence of a foreign state. Yet the
great mass of busy Amerioans was l:eing disturbed by the oft repeated charge
that the covenant must be defeated or qualified because it violated the

42

-

Ibid.,

3141-45.

palladiuro.

or

their liberties.

The impression 'Was being created that all bur-

dens fell on us alone, whereas eve:r:y member of the league was

nrJ.tu~

rea

sponsible. 4.3
Senator Walsh, of r'iontana, on July 28, emphasized. the peraistent
ignoring of the phrase "as against external aggression" in Article 10.

He

denied the assumption that the right. of revolution was infringed and challenged anyone to show where armed force for the :reeing of Ireland or Shantung was

to come from.

History afforded so few examples oJ: states

WlSell'1sb~

inter-

vening in behalf of rebels fighting for freedom tha.t our intervention in Cuba.

had. been proclaillled as absolutel;y unique in that respect, and yet we

catI'.Ie

out

of the war with Porto Rico and fue Philippines.

"It is worthy of remark that those who most s tautly assail this
fea.ture

or

the Covenant avow witb equal vehemence and insistence that we lilUBt

keep out of the quarrels of Europe."

It is plain that the Irish could expect

no armies from the United States, even if' the opponents of the Covenant won.
Heither could they expect them from impotent Germany or f'J'lgland I s ally France

or illiberal and woak Spain. France and s,l:.Iain had tried repeatedly in general wars to free the Irish but had. never succeeded.

Irelanc1' s freedom did.

not lay in the armed force of other nations.
But the League did offer hope

ot Irish independence

by enabling

through Article II any friendly power to bring Irela.-xl's oause before the
Lea.gue tor discusoion and through Article 10 by removing the supposed military

4J

-

Ibid.. .31.3S.

menace in a free Ireland which England

alw~

professed to fear.

The case of Shantl.lllg offered a sL'11ilar situation.
also been condemned as perpetuating the Shantung settlement.

was condemned as part.

or

Article 10 had
This settlement

a campaign to deteat the League because, it vas

maintained, the President agreed. to it to save the League.
That was what hurt.

"Wilson saved. the Leag'Ue by giving Shantung

to the Japa·- expressed equally, malice toward the builder end his creation.

yet, again, how was China to be helped by defeating Article 101 What nation
was going to send armies and navies to take Shantung away from Japan? Yet

Article 10 o.ftered China a guarantee against furt:.her aggreSSion which she had
sadl.y needed for a century and certainly needed
Article 10 was the "soul and. spirit
Walsh.

stlU~

or

the Covenant" said Mr.

That was why- those who Wished to deteat the wnole plan desired to

emasculate it.

They said American boya would have to tight 10 tbis or that

hypothetical war, forgetting to say that i f this

Val'

took: place some boys

every other quarter or the globe would bave to go too. Senators
sight or. the deterrent effect of' tile Article even while extolling the

from

Doctrine.

lost
tJIonroe

How bad the Doctrine preserved peace except by the promise to pun-

isb aggression? There were only two ways to maintain peace--either by agree-

menta such as thts or by actually establishing an international. police force
equal to the job.44

4U Cffiireseional Record, 66 Cong., 1 Seas., 1919, .3222-28.
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•
Senator Williams then applied the dpctrine of the free and un<

trammelled choice to the units within a state.
state in the union said, ttl am

~

Suppose each citizen or each

own sovereit,'11, responsible to nobody' but

God, and at t he right time I will do the right thing, and I want to be .free
to say when I shall do it and \-There I shall do it and hm-r I shall do it.1t
Could you get civilization within the nation this wa;y?
The assumption that it was human nature to fight and you could not
change human nature, was a stupid, barbarous utterance, sald 111'. \-lilliams, as
i f human nature had not changed from the day our ancestors drank mead out of

skulls of their enemies.

Human beings were fallible-but why gaze so in-

tently at the specks on the rising sun of the Covenant that you failed to see
the s un itself,45
Another Democratic Senator,

~x.

Thomas, of Colorado, delivered a

long considered speech the next day in which he held that morality was static
and human nature unchanging.

Internationalism would be a menace i f racial in-

stincts didn't make it unattainable.
He was followed by the venerable Senator Nelson, Republican of
Minnesota, who thought the entangling allicmce agreement came entirely too
late.

The Senator favored s orne reservations because doubt and controversy

had arisen but he had not

It

groped around to find objections to defeat the

treatY" for he was imbued with the faith that fundamentally the general. pur-

45

-Ibid., 3230-35.

pose of the LeaGue was sound and fully WUXTanted.46

Senator Hansdall .. of LO"..u.siana,

tilOfl

reviewed the proeressively

rising costs and destructiveness of war and Senator OWen llnked the Monroe
Doctrine and the Covenant togethor as common in purpose and as mutually
strengthening each other. 47
But all the arguments made in the Senate did not advance ratification.

Republican Senators had been generally pledged to a pOlicy of reserva-

tions or rejections, with an \Ulderstanding that reservations would be thus
&lsureci, and the President was not ready to accept reservations, though Mr.
Taft was by this time conv.lnced that the '.['reaty could not be rat1fied \d.thout

them.

uS
The i:eginning of August brought evidence of strength in botb the

irreconcilable and mild reservationists camps. A group of seven Republican

Senators agreed to support. a draft of reservations covering withdrawal,
Article 10.. danestic questions and the 11onroe Doctrine.
sponsored these mild reservations were,

l~eNary,

The Senators who

Oregon; McCumber, North

Dakota; Colt, Rhode Island; Spenser, Hissouri;Cummins, Iowa; Kellogg,

i'1innesotaJ and Lenroot, Wisconsin---,eJ) rie.tamers except one. They did not
present their reservations to

~tr.

with Administration leaders.

Their purpose was to hold a balance of power

46 Ibid., 3320-23.
47 Ibid., 3397-3404.

-

48 Ibid., 3230-35.

Lodge tor approval, but were in negotiation

6)
that would oompel one or both of the other groups to modify lts position.
Which group would accept InOd.i£ioation would be interesting to see.

49

The ohance of agreement with the ratifioation group seemed but. for
relatively few, the best, for the irreconoilables were inoreasing

st.eadi~

the s cope of their attacks. Senator Borah, was satisfied with the reaults of
shooting at Artiole 10 and was now bringing Artiole 11 under fire.

The lrra-

oonoilables, however, were in a per.t"eot position for future offensive, due
to their control of the Senate Forelgn Relations Cornm1ttee.SO
By the end of July the Senate Foreign Relations

Camtwa had fin-

ished forma.lly reading the 'l'reaty line by line. The Committee then prooeed.ed
to bold a serles of hearings at which all the available Amerioans of importance who had been attached. to the American Peace Commission

W8re

examined.

These gentlemen, together with written replies tram the President, convinced.
the OOlrlld.ttee that th,ey were not to have acoess to &13 detailed records of the
Peace Conference that indicated bow many disputed points had been settled
there.

They got an opinion from Nr. Lansing that the President need not have

yielded on I;)hantung, but the ea.r~ hearings

HeJ"e

not very productive. 51 So,

atter they had axamined everybody who might, have enlightened them, except
Colonel House who was :t.ill in Parls, they decided to qUestia.l the Prosident
publicly 1£ he 'Would consent.

49 New

Ynrk TL"'ieS,
SatUl'day, A'l€.'USt 2, 1919, pt. 1,
T

_ _ •.....,.........

-

He agreed, and, on August 19, the session 'Was

J
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51 U. S. Congress, Senate Document lC6, 66th COfl~., 1st Seas.,
Vol. 10, Wednesday, August 6, 1'19,
1919, 14$06.

wui"iIiiiton,

held in the 'White House while., group of stenographers reltqed. the proceed1nga,

to a large gathering of newspape1"Jllfm in the basement.
The conference lasted three and a halt hours with the discussion
covering a wide range of su.bj acta bu.t turning generalq around the obl.1gat10ll8 in Article 10.

The President maintained throughout that tJle guarantee

lWas moral not legal. A legal obligation

8pac1fic~

bouncl you. to dO a par-

ticular thing lUlder penalty. Such an obl1ga.Uon could not exist bet.ween sovereign states. A BlOral obligation 1188 indeed. superior to a legal obligation
and even more binding, but it always inTolYed the right to eDreise ju4gment
and decide whether under the circumstances the obligation applied and called
for action.

This discretion remained in Congress and could not be taken

The results were J!lUch as usual.

A careful camus of the coadt-

It

tee on the return of the Senators to theirotfices showed an absolutely
changed alignment.

aW.,.

UJa-

The President did not convince any Senators who are oppos-

ed to the league or treaty, or any of those who want resenations."

But, it

seemed that he inspired thoselho favored ratificaUon without ohange with

more enthusiasm.$2
A few days later the Committee voted,

directly to put Japan out of Shantung.

9-8, to amend the Treaty

On the same dq, August 2), it adopt.-

ed fifty amendments designed to rem.oV8 the .Amerioan members from. ne..l,y all

of the uommisaions set up to enforce the weaty.
Then in answer to the President'. plea for a report on the treaty

6S.
it opened "the Alaerican Oonference- and

proc~ed

to hear the gr.i.8V'ImCes of

ever,y group of people disappointed at the Peace Conference who oare4 to appear

befont it. The EQp1;ians led otf, followed b1 the Irish, Li1;huaniana.
Latvians, Esthomans, Negro Americans, Hungarians, AJ..banians, Jugo Slavs and

Ital.1ans. Ma.D;r of the delegations were ••U.appoint.ed, but the Oa.mt1ttee
list.eDed gra'Vely and sympatJlet.lcally to their troubles, as it it could. do

something tor them. Most of the. vere American citizens and voters. No suspicion of hyphenation was lodged against th-.53
As thia program got well under wq the President, made his final d....

cision, at the close of August, to appeal in person to the people of the Wes1;
who had elected, hila.
In the meantime, the speech Making had continued. in the Senat..

senator Fall, of New MexiCO, rerdnded. the senate that this idea ot a milleDnium was rather old and protested that i t we joined. the League

we

would not

onl.3 destroy the government of our fathers, but, cOlrmdt a ·cri_ against the
nations of the earth, against civilization itselt •••• "
the

4th,

Senator Sterling, on

suggested. that the clause requiring the fultillJnant of obligations

be.rore withdrawal would make departures

tr~

the League impoaslble. Senator

Watson, ot Indiana, attacked. Japan f8 record. at length. Senator lellogg, defended t.he constitutionality ot League lIt'Dbership, at the same ti1lle pleading

for reservation.
On August 12, Senator Lodge delivered his first prepared attack

SJ U. S. Congress, Senate, CRS10nal Recont, 66th Cong., 1st
SesSion, Tuesday, August 12, 1919. Vol. ~. 4, gu1iIng'Eon, 1919, .3778-.318l

atter the submission of the treaty.

Covenant.

He began wit.h the preamble of the

"'Brave words, indeed,'" !hen he discovered that Article .3

a.ct.u~

gave the league the right to interfere in the internal contlict ot its mabers to "'deal with" an;r matter af'tecting the peace of the world.

Be could

see no distinction whatever between legal and moral. obligations in connection
with Artic~e 10. We might well have to whip China in Shantifmg.

.And. 11' Xing

Hussien ot Hedju., then attacked by the Bedouins. appealed to u tor aid we
would be bound to send American troops to Arabia. There would be no escape
except by- breach of faith.

And there was no d.oubt whatever in his mind that

other nations might order American ships and troops to ar17 part of the world..
This must not be.

It must be made perfectly clear that not even a corporal

t.

guard could ever be ordered qvhere except by the constitutional author:l.t7 of

the Un! ted States .54
Senator Nugent, Democrat of Idaho, speaking on August

25,

knew of

no reason why a distinction should be draWh between the "sovereign right. of
a nation to plunder its weaker neighbors and the -right of an indtYiduaJ. to
do

410."1

mambers

Moreover. whatever sovereign rights we lost would be lost by other

wo,

so we would be in the same relative position. The "1Sove:reign

right" to declare war exactly when it pleased. us had been given up

alre~

in

the twenty-eight Bryan peace treaties ratified by the senate .5S

54
5S

-

Ibid., 3781-84.

U. S. Congress. senate, Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess., August .30, 1919. Vol. ,8, Pt.. 5, wasnIniEon, ~!9, 4259-426.3.
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Senator Knox clOlecl the August debates by d.eclaring himself opposed

to the whole treaty. He had. held. a conference of ilTeccmcilable senatore
A~

21, a week before the President

r~

OIl

announced. hie decision to CO

before the count,rr, at which plans were IIIde tor a apeald.ng 1;our of

Senat.Ol"8

in the Weet designed. to l:ring about. the cOJUpl.ete defeat. or the League.56
Wilson then decided to appeal to the people to 8tpport him. He
was conv:1.need. that the :masses voulcl rall.y

0IlC8

more, and an organised and

overwhel.m:tng public opinion would. torce the Spate to act.

p~

and favor-

ably.

Wilson undertook the arQuoua journe;y against the aiv1ce of I>h7si-

cians and frlenda. His health bad never been robust" and he was now veak and.
trembling.

Six years .. Chief' kecutive, with the lnterno of a World War and

the madhouse

or a Peace Cocterence

thrown in, had taken

its toll. The

Republican opposition at hOJlle, to 81!1?1 nothing of oppressing domestic probl. .
and .the heat

ot washington

had sapped his strength.57 The President kn_ he

was taldng a grave chance" however, hesLid. h. would be glacl to give his

lir.

tor the cause.58
The President set out from Washington on September 3. A.tt.er speak.
ing in Ohio and Indiana, he passed on

to the trans-MiSsissippi Meddle Wes't.

His reception here, though enthusiastio, were not all that his Mends might

56 . C2!!fF!!!ional RecOlld, 66th Cong • .t 1 Sess., 1919, 4493-4,0l.
57 Ed.ith Bolling Wilson, Memoir, Inc11anapolia, 1939, 274.

58

T\maulty, Wilson

!! 1. ltnfiiW

Him,

4.3S.

68
..
Already axl'l&usted he did not ha.ve time to prepare :b..is speeches

have desired.
proparly.

He ma.de some palpable errors of tact, and. he so tar lost his cus-

tomary dignity as to challenge his adversaries to ttput up or shut. up.lt> He

Vd

also under the handicap or placing the best possible interpretation on wa:t;
he knew was an iropertect trea.ty.

aut. when WUson reached !-1ontana. and Idaho

he was welcomed vith demonst.rations that were vell-..'ligh unbelievable.
Washington" Oregon and Oilltornia warmed to the president.59 The climax of

the Presidentts sojourn in Los Angeles came when lJman J. Gage, Seoretary of
the treasur-I in President. Mcf.inley's cabinet, said to !rlJn, ttl think I express
the sentillent of the great mass ot the people when I sq 'God bless President

liilson. Go on With the work. taW
Disturbec:l by the reception that Wilson was receiving, Bewral

the":1rreconcilable'l:

senators, notabq Borah of Idaho

and. Johnson o!

ot

Cali.forni~

carried through plans to Ittrail" the :'residant, speaking in aom.e of the same

cities a little later on the other aide ot t.i.e subject. As orators they were

nntch better tl,a..'l the President in speaking to immense audiences and better

able to play on the emotiQ!l8 of the masses. Johnson was so grateful o€;cause

ot the response he received that he begged!or more delay, saying, ull ve
could just get sixty days before the final date the American people would make
thtlir desires know in such u.mrr1stakable tams that nothing 'Would be lett of

this treat.,.••61
•

S9

!!!!2!! tim.,

60

~., Sept.

-

61 Ibid..

Sept. 18, 1919.

19, 1919.
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CHAPTER IV •
RESEt1VAT!ONS TO THE TImA1'Y

UteI' the President.s trip was well started 1.he senate Foreign
Relations COIlmlittee brought in its report, on September 10. The report of

6-

Republican MJorlty-a. bitterly partisan dool.ll!leDt--propoaed tort;y-tive
amendmentl and tour reservations.

were rejected on t.be

Alter prolonged clebate, the amend.ment8

ground tbat the entire 'eace Conference would. have to be

reconvened. to aak. thea valid.

Instead, the Senatre by an abIost solid

Republ1can vote added :f'ourt.een so-called

Lodge

reservations. Thea. were oat..

aib13 designed to release 'the United States trom certain entanglements, and to

safeguard. Aaerican 1nst1tutions and historic poliCies inCluding the Monroe
Doctrine.1

Wilson had expreaaed .. willingness to accept mUd reaerY'ationa
but be balked at those

or Senator Lodge,

Article 10, "the heart of the Ocmman\.·

particularq the one that struck at
The Pnt81dent tel:t., not without

,reaaoa, that 11 be ab.oui1d oonsent to the Senat.G reservations, the opposition
voulcl add others that he could not accept. He alao believed that 1#he SenaW

would cmm.tual.ly be toreed into 11M beoause -the altemat.1ve o£ going back
to 0el"JlWV"

to negotiate a new

\rea"".

would be

-too abBurd.1t' At this oru.c1al

...m, Wilson wrote a letter to hia lo7al Democrat1c following,

70

• • • In I\Y opinion • • • 1\he LodgeresolutiOD d.oe8 not. provide tor rat1f'1cation but rather. tor the mJJlificat10n or the
t.re&t7. I aincerel7 hope that 1ibe frlend8 and supporters of the
\reaV v1ll vote against the Lodge resolution oi ratiticaUOD.
I underatanct that the door will probably then be opeD tor
a. genuine resolution of rAtification.
I trust that all tN. friends o! the treatT will refuse to
support the Lod&e resolution.2
The crucial vot.e

Wa3

take on tne next Qq, November

treaty with the fourteen reaerv&tiona,
na.ya.
four

Wda

19, 1919. The

de!eatad b,y a vote of 39",feas to

SS

The;yeas consisted of thirtj"-tive ltreservaUOIli.st8u. Republicana and
De.~taJ

t.he na;ya oonsisted or thirteen "irreconcllable" Republicans,

together 'With the oVEIl"II,helming majority or the Democrats, fort.y.two altogether
who

loy~

followed their fallen lead.er 1 8 requeet..

S1noe theae Democratio

vo\es defeated the treaty with resarYat1ona, it might be saiet that. 'WilBon b.i1Iselt kept tho United States ou.t of t.be League of Nationu.
The RepubUc81l8 rejoiced., but

lash

or

1;he t.reai;.y'

was not dead. Under the

a strong public reaction the Senate voted. to recona1der its dec1aion,

and on Februu-y 16, 1920, the debate was resumed.

The treaty came to a 'VOte

on March 19, 1920. There were otten disouaai0n8 which Decaae beated.. There

were tU'teen reservat.ions this ti.me--one had been added in favor oL Irish
independence" A8 betore, Wllaon wrote a letter to the rudderleaa Dem.ocrata
in the Senate expressing h:ia desire tha.t the treatv with reservations be
j ected.

Inn,

He insisted,

2 OogE!!81onal Record, 66th Oong., lst Sese., 1919,

8768 •

.3 ·The Rejection or the Treaty.,It. Lit.er!!Z Digest. New York,
Nov. 29, 1919. l.l.
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•

72

E1tiler we should enter the J.ea&ue taarlesa13t. accepting the
nspansib1l1ty am not tearing the role of leadersm.p which we now
enjoyI contributing our efforts towards establishing a just and permanent peace, or we should retire as graee1'ully as possible from
the great ooncert ot powers by which the world was N."I'fJd..4
The Democrats in complying Vith the President's request apparently

believed that after a complete deadlock had been established by the two
\lpOQ

Yo1;ee;

rat1tlcation a set ot cOIIpromise reservatJ.ons acoeptable to both aidd,

would be worked

out. The hope proved vain at the olose ot the .ession, but

the daIIandB tor a compromise were so strong in the count17 that an unofficial.
OOJlO1l1ation comm1tt.ee vas constituted. after the holidays oonsisting of tMo

Republlcans regulars,

Sena~l'S

Lodge and New, two middle grounders'. Kellogg

and Lenroot and £1ve Democrats. The irreconc1lables were not dil"eOtly re.l)re-

sented, but at the crucial moments, When the group seemed. about to agree on a
:resenation. to Article 10, Senators Lodge and New went into conference with
thea and progress ceased}

The President, in thiS, remained opposed to altering the Treat,.
and

11M 80

convinced that the oou.nt.17 thought likewise that he wrote the

Jackscm Dq Diners on January 8, urging a great and. solea referendum em the

subject. of the cQling elect.ion.
W. cannot rewri'tie tb1a treaty. We mu.st take it without change
1Ib1ch alter its meaning, or lea.,. it, and then, atter the rest of
the world baa signed. it, we
.face the uuthinkable task of ma1d.ng
cother and separate kind or treaty 'With Gemany.6

1lWI'

h CO!!fP"!!sional Record, 66 Cong., 2 Seas., 1920, 402$.
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had
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1D

the Republ1can 1ea4era, nor d1cl the 1clea of 1ft appeal to the people

8Il\hu1Ma

4I'f1d.eftce

th! people
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the UD1W

ata_

La. . . no technical objec1;101l1 8houlel !apiIde

pred1oaaen\ • ., pecul1a:r \0 the AIIer10an
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• future C0DgJ'888 8hoW.d us. . the

tac\1on t.h1a NMJ'Yation " ..

oblip.tio~

Y1~ . . . .1Q7

at. the t:I..M. Acoord1ng to one

to preserve

OU" ~

and.

tull7.atep.ard it_ the reaervaUon rea4,
!be Un1te4 st&tee Mauaea no obligation to pl"88ene the tem.Wr1al intear1v or polit1oal ~ of 8IJ7 other count.r.Y or
to 1Dt.erten in contrcwes'8iea ~ DaUona........wb.ether JIeIIbeJ:'8 of
the Leape or not-'lJIId.w the pron.a1ona of Art10le 10, or to _lo7
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of the tna\7 tor aD7 purpose, unleaa 111 ar:t;f part.1cu.l.&r case the
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pl"OYide.9

!h4I Wrd rea8l'YllUon pl"OV1.dld \hat, no undat.e OftI' 8fII' of the ocacp.enc1 terr1W1"1ee 8houl4 be aoepk4
~

Coupoes8, •

1DI

which vaa,

bT the

aca1D,

UD1W States without act.1on of

aee4lea.

OJ'

to the attitude held toward the Prestdcq aal

Pres1da\ of the 1d.at. It would.

atWilpt to • __ on b1a own
one that he could

0Dl.7 be •

-~\7

urcentll' requ1red. aeOOl'tl-

eapeo1al.l¥ "'*aJ'd. the

nail Prea14eDt, :S.DdMd Who voalcl

n . a napouaibllit7 tor the c oua1iI7.

bardl7 ainta1a 1 _ v1thoat &Cu.

YOte CII1 the ol.awJe.. on

'ebna:t7 26, ... 68

to

of COIlp"888.

14.10

I'a1.ler tour wamed the J:,eaaue ..., f'rca 1n\erleren.ce

Jl8lftJ.o attaire or with 81J7 cone.,. that, _zoe even
the titt,.-aeYeJ1

atatea who jo1Ded

the Leape

aboIlt, 1ntertereDOe with ita dClle8td.c

their 4caeR1c

9

the tiDal

DO

~

single

c1aJaea'Uo. .bloIlC

ODe

atta1r8. fhe7 were

nth our d.o-

bee_ a1ana4

jut, u

jealole of

1Dtecr1t,. tooo, .. we cOlll4 be-• ...ancl1lalV' of them. a hundred.

n-inc,

United State8

e

l:!!! Iee!. 4l8.

10 C5!!£!!!lonal Reoorcl, 66 Cong., 2

SeI._, 1920, 3S14.

u.s
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.
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p~
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t10D11 that, ....rnt1.on 10.
~
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~
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to toreip
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R1~

nb3"' in ......
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~
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~

..
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York,
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It would hU;lTe not been an occasion tor surprise however, i t SOl'l18 Latin CO\IDJoo

.

tl')"

had telt it a good opportunity to disavow our hegemony over this hemi-

sphere and to maintain that since the assertion of the Doctl"ine's validity in

definition of the Doctrino and s orne limitatio.ns of our yl"eten&ion under it.
The fUth reservation informed the members

ot the Lea€;'Uo that.

The United States 'lIdll not submit to k'l. rb1tration or to inqlliry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations,
provided for in sro..d treaty of peace, ;;,ny questio,ns }lhich in the
judcment of the United States depend upon or relate to long established. policy, c01'JJmOl1ly known as the Monroe Doctrinel said d0ctrine is to be interpreted by t.b.e Ullited States alone and is hereby declared. to be who~ outside the jurisdiction of said l.eag;ue
of Nations and entirel,r une.t£eotecl by at\'Y provision contained in
the aaid treaty of peace with 0e1'l!lallY.
~'he

long attack upon the Shantung Bettlement and upon Japan's mo-

t1VEla came to an end with the a doption of tbe

comparati~

mild statement

that "The United States witholds ita assent to Articles 156, 157 and 158, and
receives full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may
ariae under said articles ._14

'W'hether the Japanese government of the d 8.y would have been tolerant and s trent:. enough to have aaaented to
condit.ion can neva%' be known.

~

entry into the League under this

The pride of the Japanese people had been

deeply hurt by the rejection of t.heir racial eq;uality declaration
Peace Conf'erence and this

ot

th~

r eel.1ng

~J

the

had not been all.a.yed by the sustained ettoJ"t,

Anse..."'ica1'l Senators to bold up their succession to the Geman property in

14

C~sional Record,

66 Gong., 1 Seas.,

~19j

8794.
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China u an a:ampl. of the

8.

aros-

1aoral1Uu· pexpetratecl 1D the t:rea.. Po-

lit1c.l neceaa1v, i t I1Otb1Jla aore, .., well haft lecl the Japmeae GovenJ.ment

to

1"flh8. \0 ..
!he

th1a resenaUon.15

~

l"eServa\1011 '1188 des1ped to preYeD' 8l\V' American tl'Oll

aen1na e1iheJo officially or unott1c1al.l7 1lpoa arJ7 boc17 set up br \he fl'eU1'
or League ua.leaa author1aed by CongresB to do 80. the e1&htb claimed for that.

bodT .. right to OYerrule

the 1lepvation C0IIIJd.881on on owtain cont1DpDo1• •

fbe ninth Wol"lll8d. the lAaaae that CoDgreu would have to pan upoa Iltt¥ of 1_
expens_ att.l'ibuted t.o
OTel"looked.

b.r the

WI.

two of theae deolarat1ona Il&7 have ·beeJl

poY'8I"8, but

eaa113

\he pr1nc1pal A1l1_ would haw bad cause t.o

JIIea11;.aw before g1T.lng our Conareas a veto

0'9'f'.r

one at \he moat

~

powve of the Reparation Gcad.8s1on.16
!he tenth prov.181on sought to make 81ll"8 that the ancient right of

selt

del... ...

not abo11ahecl aDd. that

CGQgIWJ8

1ld.ght approve

mv

iUW

n-

ductioo, whUe the eleYeftth quieted the professed tears of Senatore, that the
eOOl1<111o boyoott applied. to a ccmmant breald.ng state II1ght 1:At extea.ded to ita

clti_ 11T.tDg 1D other CCNIltriea. 10 posa1b1l1ty, hoveYer
~

b7 the

League

w.

:ramo'-,

of tutun

'Wng overl.oolced· b;y the 1"OIIen'&t1on1ata az:td no ....,r,.-

tu.rd.t;y to .nc.tl.7 defend the rJ.ghta ot the .A.lae.J'ioana • • p_sed by. fil11a \be
Wel.ttII nsern.t1on dealing with two &l"t1clee of the trea'by which provided £01'

the lJ.qu1dat,i0ll of debts betweeft oiU. . . at tJle e1pat017 artaMa forbade the

15 Miller,!t AA!a!!.!!l!
16 ne1U!,

Conteraqc~.2£

UDi~!":*'M.!!!!:!!

Para, sa).

h!!ee, 1&26.428.

constru.ction
'¥'eDt1on

or

thee. art.lo1ea into

ot tbe rights

or

~

"otberv.1se Illegal or in e+:mtr..

citiaena of the United States."

The th1rte.l1:h clause

or

the proposed resolution of ratification

looked vittl auspiolon on the Internationa1 lAbor Organ1zat10D and. procl.a:1.me4
ODce more the right of Congress to regulate our cO'ldng and going in the

teaeue

It .delt
the United Statel v1thold8 its.. . anent. to Part. XIII, ~!,iclea
)87-b27, 1n.ol.,1ye, UDleaa Qongraa b.r aft or Jo1Dt l'88OlU.UOD 8ha1l
~

make prov18ion tor representaticmin the organization eatabllaW'IV sai4 Part. XIII, ad in nob ftY8Ilt, the part1cipat.101l of t1:ut
Un! ted States wiU be governed aM conditioned b,y the pravi.lons of
such act or joint :N8olut1oa.17

fhe sU8ta1neci cautpaign to oomrinoe HOtiou of \he A1Ier1om people
'tba\ the l.eagu.e would be controlled.

b.Y

Great, Br.I.taiD ended 1D tJle c1eclaratia

tba"t

Until Part I, belu& the OO'ftD&Qt of the Le......... at .at1ou,
aball be 80 aMnded as to provide that \be 11n1ted States shall be
entItled to cast It. numbel' o£ VOMs equ.ad to that which alii member
or th$ League and. ita aelt-eOYel"ft1.ng doa1ni01'l8, coloni., or parts
of empiru, in the ~:1"eiate shall be eutJ.tled. to cut, the United
States 88SUUS no obligation to be bound. by tJZ11' election, decision,
report or t1nd1.ng of the OOWlOil or AaBalblJ 1n wh1ch &rI,1 ID8IabeI' 0:
the teague ano. ita lIelt..govem1:ng dominions, colonies or parts ot
eaapire 1D. the 8I&l"8pte haye cut, more thm one vote ••••••
The United St&t8a uaumee no obligation to be bound 1>7 8.tV'
cieo181oD, report or ~ n4:! III of the CotmC11 or the M.embly ari81Dg
OQt. ot artT diapuw bftW'8a the Un1\e4 Ita. and. &IV' IlfDber of the
League i t such lIaIber, or an:r eeU-sO'Nl'll1Da da1n1oa, oal.onv.....
pin or part of .-p1re UD1tect With it. pollt.1cal.lJ baa .ot.eci.l.o
!be result wu that .. put 1t up to the countries wno are DlOI!St like

17 IbU••

hh99.

18 C2!£!!81caal Re;oortl, 66 COl'll., 2 a.s._, 1920, 4061.
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us 111 language and customs, in blood and. ill

r~ligion,

and whoae international

problema are most ald.n to ours, either to have an:r action of the League in
1dti.eh thq participated open to question or disayowal.
WI

IX1

our pan or to gi....

a representation which would upset the principle of the equality of .'tate-

the only basis UPon which there was a chance of bu:J]d;lng the League. It might
be true enough that

ffr8'q ..:ber

of the League would in prac't1.ce wield. intlu-

enOe in propon1on to its PGlfV and resources, but the smallest atat.. priaed

their tormal equality in the ffllLily of na1;ions. The action of the AJlerioan

senate Ddght be due solely to int,ernal politics; nevertheless, the dAmtlopinl
nationalities within the British Impire could

to a lwer statu at

0Ul"

h~

be expecWd to sink back

request nor the pQWertul Allies to allow multiple

votes without inoreasing our ow..
The ohaoa clue to tollov such a scramble tor power and place ... of

no conseqwmce to the S...tora. Nor were t,hq conoemed over '\he probable rejenion of thia oonditi. to our ent17 into the Leape. People u prowl u
0Ul'8

were expected. to acquiRe.. The ad.Tea" of the British Domirdon to na-

tioDhood, which their lIIlUIbersbip in iihe 'eace coutercce an.c:1 in t.h6 Laagu.e
had AmlOlitl.Ced had. been oordially accepted. ~ the other nations and conwated

b7 none, no matter how alien to thea in culture

and. 1ut.1tuttons the

new:

a"a".. thu recogDised might 'be. It raMi ned. for the leaders of the oount.r,r

JIlO8t akin to thea to preach as supposed clomi Dation that aroused. nobody elee.
Shonq betore the final

'f'O't,e

in March, 1920, a. combination of

Democrats and Republicans spoUed. the aymaet.ry or the 'curteen Besern.t1ona

b7

add~ng

a fifteenth, on the subject of Ireland. Introduced b;r Senator
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0erl7, Democrat of PJl.ode Island.- it was
an ettort to hold the Irish vote
astioally voting yea.

or

frownf}d on by the Lodge RepublicaDS as

)8 to 36,

~rith

the bitterenders enthusi-

The Republicans divided 18 tor and 20 againstr The

Democrats split 20 tor and 16 against.
the last of the reservations set forth that.

In consenting to the r-a.tif'ication of the treaty with Germa.V
the United States adheres to the princi;Jle or selt-determ1nation
and to the resolution ot s)'mpa:tJ'~ with the aspirations of the Irish
people tor a government ot their own choice adopted 'b'-J the Senate
June 6, 1919, azxi declares t1'lat when such a government 18 attained
to Ireland, a coosunnation it is hoped is at hand, it should proo.ptq be aimittad as a member of the League of Nationa.19
The Senate in one reservation dared

~

even to consid.er any-

thing that we might label a domestic question, and in another encouraged a

separate movement in the tarritoI7 of a friendly all;y. In one reservation it
inveighed against the six BriUsb votes in the AssemblyI and in another prqed

tor the creation ot a sevent.h. Strangely enough, too, this last. wish of the

Senate is the only one t!'lat was granted. The Irish Free State has been a
proud and. active member of the League

or

Nations since 1923.20

The second, which was the most disputed. reservation read -

in

November.

The United states US'W1le8 no obligation to preserve the territorial or political independence ·0£ alV other oountry or to interfere
in controversies bett/8eU nationa.....whether memberu of the ~ or
not--under the provision of Article lO" or to employ the military or
uaval. torces o£ the United States under any article of the treaty for
an::! purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, whioh under

19 Ibid.,

4499.

20 Fleming, United States

.2 .!!!!!

Leaeme,

433.

the Canst!tutton, his sole poW'er to decllU'e war or authorize the
emplOJ1llS!lt of military or naval forces of the United States shall
by act of joint resolution so provide.21
On ~1arch

12, Lodge,of'fered a substitute by adding "ita resources

or any form of economic discrimination."

This invalidated the cla1m of the

mild reservationiBts that the reservations left the economic bo;ycott in

fun

force.
Th1a sharpening of' the reservationista caused the irreconciliablea

to set up a wail that the new drat't was realJJr a surrender

by Lodge.

'.i:hey

considered it weaker tban the original. So the phrase "including aU oontroversies relating to territorial lntegr.l.ty or political independence," vas inserted to make sure that the article real.:Qr negatived. 'the torm of' t.b.e final
reservation was therefore:
The United states assumes no obligation to preserve the terr1torial integrity or polltical indep(;:lldence of' any other country by
the employment of' its milltary or naval forces, its resources, or
any form of economic disori.Idnation, or to interfere in any wq in
controversies between nations, including all territories relating
to territorial. integrity or political. independence, whether members
of the League or not, under the provision of Art.lcle 10, or to employ
the mU1tary or Daval f'oroe of the United Stai;es, under any artiole
of the treaty for any prupose, unless in any particular case or the
Congress, whioh under the Conetitution has the sole power to declare
war or authorize the employment of' the milital"'J or naval f'oroes of
the United Sta.tes, shill in the exercise c.! .t'ull liberly ot action
by act or joint resolution so provide.22
The treaty came to a. vote on ?4aroh 19, 1920 and i' ailed to reeelve

the necessary two-thirds majority by a vote of 49 yeas to 3, nays. The nqs
oonsisted of 12 "irreoonc1l1able" Republicans, plus twenty-three Democrats
21 CogI1!8sional Reoord. 66 Cong., 2 Sass., 4211.

-

22 Ibid., 4324.
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who remaiued loyal to Wilson.

Since it was obvious that the treaty would not;:e rat.tried without

reservations, t1Jooty-one Democrats forsook their leader and voted for approval4
This may not havo hapvened had the l'resident been silent.

He asked for com-

plete viotor,y and rece1ved none.
The failure of the President t s plan
causes.

Among the 1mportant i"!.Ctors were

~ be

i~'!lora.noe

attrlbut«1 to lllaUY

or

the treaty, COf'..:f'usion.

of thought, jealousy of Senatorial prerogative, personal hatred ot tl:1.lson, and
a strong tradi tionaJ. policy of isolation.

Reservations killed the treaty.

The Lodge reservations 'Were added by an almost solid Republlcan vote and oppos-

ed by an almost solid Democratic vote.

Tids evidence suggests that partisan

politics pure and simple contributed more than 8.l\Ything elae to the de.teat
'Wilson in the Senate.

or

Had he been a RepubH.can the d eciBion might have been

reversed.
j/ilson's

p~8ical

might have seen the wisdom

had been more

close~

or

collapse was a vital factor in the outcome.
accepting a compromise i t he had. been well,

in touo..i. ld.th the drift

probahq not f'ulq cognizant of' the true
single-track mind, he

liSS

s~te

ot publlc op1n1on.
of atf'aira.

a.m

But he was

Subbol'fl an:l of a

permitted to see only a few people, and tr..ese were

loath to shock tlle sick man with disagreeable realities. Whether
formed. or not, Wilson rejected

t.~e

propel'~

Lodge reservations outright, apparently

hoping that in 1920 the voters would rise up and deIllaIld an 'Wlema8culated
League.

He

in-

CHAPTl'lt V •

The Senate having failed twice

to approve the treaty, it was re-

turned t.o the President and. the majority leaders moved a. joint resolution,
April 1, 1920, 'lfhicb attempted to end the legal state of war with Germany by
the same method which inaugura.ted it.

This resolution pasaecl1n both houses

by substantial majorities, was vetoed by President Wilson }1ay 27th, and tailed

ot passage over his veto

by a vote of 220

tor repasaage to 152 against.

f.fr.

Wilson vetoed the message hoping somehow that the people would demand the

treaty 1n the a.pproaching presidential election.1
The Republican National Convention found it di.f't1cult. to frame an

acceptable pUnk on the League, because lti'i t.'hJ.n the party there were It irreconcilab1es," reseI"V'at..ionists, and advooates of the League.

It was apparently

a platform that was a masterpiece of amblgu1ty and was worded as to enable
all shades ot r.epublicana to support the party in the confident belief' that

their views would be sustained. The first paragraph read was to those who

wanted the League. It promised at the veri least a oonsultative part, with
the nations whereby "instant and. general conferenceU should be had. whensveJ'

the peace was threatened. The second. paragraph denounced. the Covenant in
words grave enough to suit any bitter opponent of the League as "certain" to

produce "the injustioe, hostility, and oontroversy among nat.ions which it pro-

1

C~8ional Record,

66 Cong., 2 Seas., 1920, 5129.

posed

to prevent"- The Reservation1sts were &e.tisf1ed

'by a suggestion that

perhaps the coming adm1n1stration would tom a new andQrtter "association" o£
nations which would doubtless be both Republican and American. "Sucb agreement With the other nations or the world as shall meet the full duty ot

America to civillzation and to humanitY"--with reservations, of course. 2
Deadlocked over a nominee, the Republ1can Convention turned, as

a compromise choice, to the handsome and affable Senator Warren G. Harding
of Ohio.' Ue wes easiq manageable, and a regular Republican. He had been a
somewhat mechanical opponent

l:dmselt to the attention

or

or

the League during the tight, and had.

c~

the party bosses months before tbe convention met.

The prospects, which were hiS, improved when be declared. that. ".A.mericats

sent

~

vre-

is not heroics but hea.1.ingJ not nostrums but nomalOYf not revol.u-

tion but restoration• • • •

It

Harding, the antithesis at Wilson, was the man

ror the timea. Unlike the unapproachable President, he was baiWellaw...well-

met. To be sure he was not an intellectual heavyweight. Wilson spoke of his
"bungalow

mind."

out as one Republ1can Senator

Said, the times did not de-

mand tt.t1rst raters.at
The Democratic Convention oonvened. in San Francisoo. and faced
si.Ular ditficulties in taking its stand. and choosing its candidate. The ocaplated platf'orm, commending the President tor his c oura.ge and. good. faith and

2 William F. Johnson, 2!O!le H!!:!!l, Boston, 1929, 281-89 •

.3

~.,

278.

4 Ibid., 280.

cha.rg1ng that the Republican SE;mate refused to' rati.t.7 tb.e treaty'

flme~

be-

cause it was the product· of Democratic stateamaDship,tt declared for the

League of Nations n as the surest. 1£ not the only practicable means of maintaining the permanent peace and terminating the insufferable burden of great

military and naval establishments."
The attitude of the Democrats toward reservations was defined as

tollOWSt
We endorse the President's view or our int.emational obligations
and his firm stand. against reservations designed to cut to pieces
the vital provision of the Versailles 'rreaty and. we commend the
Democrats in Congress tor voting against resolutions for separate

peace which would diSff,TaCO the natlon. We advocate the 1mmediate
ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair
its essenM.eJ. integrity, but do not OVlJOSe the acceptance or rese~
tions making clearer or more specific the obligations of the Unitec1
states to the League Associates.

'£h.o Democrats selected as their nominee, Govemor flax of Ohio.
The resulting carnpaign was a l1atless affair, in spite of Wilson's request
that it be a grea.t and solemn re.teren.dum.
ti2"8 the electorate was thoroughly wear,y

years old.

There can be no doubt that by th1B

or

the treaty issue

now nearly two

The sOOlewb&t confused Harding took, so clairned his oppooent, tou.:r-

teen dif"feront sta.'1da on the League question. Perhaps his most oonsistent
noto was that af'ter the election he would consult With the "best minds fl to the
end "tnat we shall bave an association of nations for the lJrOlnotion

or

inter-

national peace. tt5 In ahort, not a Democratic ttLeaguefi but a Republioation

"Associat:i.on.'" Mr. Chester nowell, a well-informed Republican journalist

wrote,

-

86..
One halt of the speeches were for tpe League of Nations i.t
you read them hastily, but if yr:JU read tllem with care every word
of them could have been read critically as against. the League of
Nations. The other half were violent speecbes against the League
i f you read. them careleesly. but i f you read them or1t,ically everyone of the.."'rl could be interpreted as in favor of the League of Nations. 6

But all this did not disturb the electorate very much.

Back to

Normalcy, was the winning slogan.

The result was a .foregone conclusion.
odds were ten to one against Cox.

on

the eve of the elect.ion

Hundreds of tbousands of eligible vaters

staJ,-ed I1Wq .from tl".ie polls. v;earied of Wilionism, the i'est rose up and cast.

a tremendous vote for Hardi.llg. As Joseph Tumulty, tlilson's secretary said,
"It was not a landslide, it was an earthqueke.n7
Was ttl" Republican triumph a repudiation

ot the

L~""Ue.

as Lodge

gloatingly asserted? There were 80 mellY isaues, ranging from prollibit1-on of
alcoholic beverages to sel.f'-determination for Ireland, that it would be diffi.
cult to sB¥ whet..lter the results were made a mandate on any one of them. The
Republican platfol"r11 was so ambiguous and the candidate

80

plat! tudinous that

"1rreconcilables" like Senators Borah and Johnson supported Harding as the

surest. wq of keeping the country out of the League" while th1rty..one pr<R1n-

ant Republicans, 1ncluding Root, Hughes and Hoover, signed a man:i.i"eato
announcing t.hat t.hey were voting .for Harding as the surest vq of getting the
country into the Le&.gue. Perhaps the Democratic !!!! !2!:! _~_or...l.d_ was not tar
from the mark when it observed, "The American people wanted a change and theJr

6 Quoted in Fleming, United
7 Blum, Josepl: Tumul;tz

ptate~.!2! ~

.!!!! 1h! lIiilson Era,

Le!SEt!, 460.
259.
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have voted for a ohar1f;e. They do not know what. ld.nd oJ: ohange they wanted,

and, they do not know tocie¥ what. kind or change they bave voted for."

If the

results were a. mandate on ruvtl'dng they were a mandate tran the people to re-

lax-to get.

aiIl&y

tram Wilsonism and to :return to "normalcy."

CUrJCLUSION
wUson was master.ful, unresponsive "to advice, avowedly partisan
and uncompromising in denumdins acceptance of his plan.

He had never enj oyed.

service in Congress and repeatedly misinterpreted the temper of the Senete anc1
of the House, and engaged. in useless controversies.

of the

~Iays

Beoause

or

his ignorance

and rules of the Senate, \Olil8on lost his greatest, battle.

Just be.tore he began the task of peri'ect1ng his peace plan and. ].qing it batore the nations at Paris, wilson made this m:1.8take.

He appealed to

the people to elect Democra.ts to Congress, on the plea. that he could not otbel'"

wise be the "unembarrassed spokesman" of the United States. Congress at th.at
time was controlled 11".1 Democrats, tnt lJartis&nSP..ip was in abeyance.

It tlamed.

into wbite heat inswmtly and in the election that tollOW'ed a few dE\,vs after
Wilson's plea, I..he people tranaferred control. of Congress to the Republican
party.

The

1ntense~

bitter feeling ot' Republicans and independent voters

against Wilson's injection ot partisanship in the rddst of war was carried into the Senate and became a factor in the defeat of Wilson's peace plan. But
it was not a prime factor.

Later events revealed that the basic reason that

caused the United States to avoid membership in the League

or Nations

was the

conflict between the J4!onroe Doctrine and the Covenant. The Un! ted States
Senate could not maintain the integrl.ty of the Monroe Doctrine and at the same
time consent· to intervention by the League in the political attain

or

the

Western Hemisphere.

WilBon invited partisan opposition again when he eJCCluded the
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Republ1cans trom consultation in the development of his peace plan and frart
partioipation in peace negotiations at Paris.
Wilson knew that one third and more of the Senate opposed his plan
to intertwine the League of !lations witb the Treaty of Versailles. What he
tailed to oonsider was that the Senate could adopt amendments and reservations

to treaties by majority vote. He believed that a two-thirds vote was necessar:

to change a treaty in the Senate. Therefore he insisted that the treaty ehou.lA
be approved 11 1thout change, fully believing that publlc sentiment would sup-

port him and on all sides it was admitted that the people tavored the Wilson
plan at tho time he admitted it to the Senate.
When the Senate proceeded to make changes in the

treaty

by majority

vote, Wilson sought to win popul.:lr support tor uncoOOitional approval by making his

western trip.
Republicans f'u.rni8hed most of the votes for reservations, but

Democrats turnished some votes in each case. Partisanship was not the motive

ot Senators

in voting upon sane reservations,

especi~p

attar public opposi-

tion developed against uncond.1t:.onal ratification. The reservations gained

approval even among Democrats in

~~e

Senate·.

There were forty-seven De."IlOCrats in the Senate, but upon the motion

to approve the treaty

unoondition~

only thirty-seven Democrats votes were

'\Yes and the motion was de.f"eated by a vote or fitty-three nayes

eight yeas. ScrlSl'l Democrats refused
tion. Since all the reservations
dent that

somethir~

1;0

~lel'O

to thirty-

accept the treaty without modUie...

adopted by bipartisall votes it is evi-

more than partisanship was at work in the Senate in re-
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..

jecting the Treaty of Versailles.

.

Objections 'Were registered against both

the Covenant and other parte of the Treaty.

l\mong the reasons for popular

disapproval of the Treaty of Versailles, after debate in the Senate had illuminated the subject were theser

The people were not w.l.lling to guarantee the terr1torial integrity

or polltical independence of other countries, they wanted the Monroe Doctrine

to 18 excepted

entire~

from the jurisdiction

or

the League, tb.e"J objected to

the transfer of' Shantung from China to Japan, they insisted upon exclusive

American jurisdiotion over pure:13 d<De8t1c questions like imm1grationJ and
~

objected to giving other nations more votes than the United States in

the League Assembly.

Again andsgain the question arises, "Should the United States have

ratified. the treaty and joined the League?" We had. very little to lose ruld
everything to gain, poesibly a preventing

or .o-called World VIP" II. No

na-

tion was ever trapped in the League as our isolationists warnedf Japan got
out, Oemany got out, Russia was thrown out. Where the possible lossee vera
so negl1g1ble and the probable gains

80

tremendous the United. States as

WUson repeatedly pointed out, was more than jwst1fied in wid ng the cbance.
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